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Abstract
A "folk theorem" originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive
equihbria are always or "generically" inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels
as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper critically
reevaluates these claims in the context of a general equilibrium economy with moral hazard. We
first formalize this folk theorem. Firms offer contracts to workers who choose an effort level that
is private information and that affects worker productivity. To clarify the importance of trading in
anonymous markets, we introduce a monitoring partition such that employment contracts can specify
expenditures over subsets in the partition, but cannot regulate how this expenditure is subdivided
among the commodities within a subset. We say that preferences are nonseparable (or more accurately,
not weakly separable) when the marginal rate of substitution across commodities within a subset in
the partition depends on the effort level, and that preferences are weakly separable when there exists
no such subset. We prove that the equilibrium is always inefficient when a competitive equihbrium
allocation involves less than full insurance and preferences are nonseparable. This result appears to
support the conclusion of the above-mentioned folk theorem. Nevertheless, our main result highlights
its limitations. Most common-used preference structures do not satisfy the nonseparability condition.
We show that when preferences are weakly separable, competitive equilibria with moral hazard are
constrained optimal, in the sense that a social planner who can monitor all consumption levels cannot
improve over competitive allocations. Moreover, we establish e-optimality when there are only small
deviations from weak separability. These results suggest that considerable care is necessary in invoking
the folk theorem about the inefficiency of competitive equilibria with private information.
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1 Introduction
A central question for economic theory is the efficiency of competitive markets. In economies
with complete markets, this question is conclusively answered by the celebrated First and
Second Welfare Theorems, which show that, under some regularity conditions, competitive
equilibria are Pareto optimal and every Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium. Nevertheless, the complete market benchmark does not cover many
empirically-relevant economies where missing markets are ubiquitous. Arguably the most
important reason for missing markets in practice is private information. Individual agents
know more about their preferences, risks and actions than the market can observe. Despite a
sizable literature on this topic, efficiency properties of economies with private information are
not yet fully understood. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of competitive equilibria in
a subclass of economies wdth private information, those with moral hazard, where individuals
take privately-observed actions affecting their endowments (and/or production).
One approach to the study of efficiency in moral hazard economies has been pioneered by
Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b). Prescott and Townsend propose the important idea
of considering insurance contracts as commodities that should also be priced in equilibrium.
Prescott and Towmsend show that competitive equihbria with moral hazard are (constrained)
Pareto optimal under two key assumptions: exclusivity and full monitoring. The first implies
that individuals can sign exclusive contracts and is a good starting point for the study of
employment contracts.^ We focus on exclusive contracts throughout the paper. The second
assumption, full monitoring, is more problematic. Under full monitoring, contracts specify
complete consumption bundles for individuals in different states of nature. This essentially
imphes that firms or some other outside agency can fully monitor individual consumptions.
This assumption is not only unrealistic but also goes against the spirit of "competitive mar-
kets." Competitive markets should allow anonym.ous trading, so that individuals are able to
buy at least a subset of commodities in anonymous markets without a central agency keeping
track of their exact transactions.
A systematic analysis of the structure and efficiency of competitive equilibria with anony-
mous trading is not available, but a series of papers by Stiglitz and coauthors, most notably,
Greenwald and Stightz (1986), and also Arnott and Stightz (1986, 1990, 1991), claim that
competitive equilibria under these circumstances are always or "generically" Pareto subopti-
' Exclusivity may be a less satisfactory assumption for insurance contracts, in particular, when informal
insurance is also possible; see, e.g., Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2003). Real-world
insurance and financial contracts often explicitly regulate what other contracts individuals can sign for the same
risks, or whether they can pledge the revenues of the same business. Exclusivity is much more natural in the
context of employment contracts we focus on in this paper.
mal. These claims are supported by local analysis of first-order conditions, though without a
rigorous proof that this type of local analysis is valid or economically important.'^ Hence one
may say that the inefficiency of competitive equilibria with anonymous trading has emerged as
a folk theorem. This folk theorem is not only of theoretical interest but has been very influential
in applied work. It is often invoked to argue that decentralized allocations in insurance, labor
and credit markets are inefficient and necessitate government intervention (or to provide the
intuition for specific models in which this is the case).
In this paper, we consider a general equilibrium environment where the structure and
efficiency of competitive equilibria with anonymous trading can be studied. The economy
consists of a large number of firms and risk-averse individuals. Individuals accept employment
contracts from firms and choose an effort level, which determines the probability distribution
over a vector of production. Individual effort is private information. Commodities in this
economy are partitioned, such that expenditures over subsets in a given monitoring partition
of commodities are observable (for example, how much an individual spends on vacation can be
determined but not how this spenchng is distributed across different activities in the vacation
resort). Employment contracts specify payments to workers and expenditure levels over the
subsets in the monitoring partitions as a function of the realization of the state of nature. The
Prescott-Townsend economy is a special case where each subset in the monitoring partition is
a singleton.'^ After all uncertainty is resolved (the underlying states of the world are reahzed),
individuals allocate the contractually-specified expenditures within the subsets in the partition
at given market prices.
We establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium and an indirect maximization prob-
lem that characterizes equilibrium allocations (Theorem 1 and Proposition 1). We then formal-
ize the above-mentioned folk theorem. We say that there is no full insurance at an equilibrium
if the marginal rate of substitution of some good between any two states is not one. can we
say that preferences are nonseparable (or more accurately, "not weakly separable"), if there is
a subset in the monitoring partition such that the marginal rate of substitution between the
goods in the subset change if the effort level is modified. Conversely, we say that preferences
'This is particularly concerning for three reasons. First and more importantly, this local analysis assumes
that a range of Lagrange multipliers exist and are strictly positive, though there is no mathematical or economic
reason for them to be so. One of our main results will establish the (constrained) optimality of competitive
equilibria under certain conditions explained below, thus invalidating this line of analysis. Second, the local
analysis makes use of differentiability assumptions and the first-order approach, which do not generally apply in
these environments (see Grossman and Hart, 1983, Rogerson, 1985, Jewitt, 1988 on the first-order approach).
Third, as we will show, it may well be that even if efficiency is "nongeneric," small deviations from this efficiency
benchmark might still lead to allocations that are approximately (e-) efficient and many inefficiencies identified
via this method may not be first order.
Another special case is one in which the partition consists of a number of singleton elements, which corre-
spond to "monitored goods," and the remainder, which comprises "nonmonitored goods."
are weakly separable when there exists no such subset (this is significantly weaker than the
standard separability assumptions often adopted in theoretical and applied work). Our first
result (contained in Theorem 2) shows that when preferences are nonseparable and there is no
full insurance at an equilibrium, then this equilibrium is constrained suboptimal (inefficient),
in the sense that a social planner who is constrained by the same moral hazard problems (but
who is allowed to monitor expenditures on all goods) can improve over the equilibrium allo-
cation.'* Note that this theorem is silent on whether a social planner who is also constrained
by the same monitoring technology can implement such a Pareto improvement, and we show
that this is not necessarily the case.^
WHLiile Theorem 2 appears to give some support to the folk theorem, the rest of our analysis
sheds doubt on its general validity and applicabiUty. Theorem 3 shows that competitive equi-
libria are constrained Pareto optimal when preferences are weakly separable (see also Theorem
6 for the case in which contracts with randomization are allowed). This is an important resxilt
for two reasons. First, most preferences used in applied work satisfy this weak separability
condition. Second, it establishes that the equilibrium is constrained optimal relative to a very
strong notion in which the social planner has access to more instruments than the market (she
can monitor and specify expenditures for all goods, whereas contracts can only do so for goods
within a subset in the partition). This result suggests that, at least in most of environments
considered in apphed work, the inefficiencies emphasized by the folk theorem do not arise.
Finally, in Theorem 7 we show that when there are only small deviations from this bench-
mark environment with weak separability, competitive equihbria remain approximately efficient
(or are e-efficient for the right choice of e). This result highlights another important concep-
tual point, that a large set of economically relevant environments may not feature meaningful
inefficiencies even if there is a "generic" inefficiency result.
Overall, although our results do not imply that competitive equilibria are always efficient
in private information economies, they delineate a range of benchmark situations in which
equilibria have very strong optimality properties. They also show that when such benchmark
situations are a good approximation to the actual environment, efl&ciency will hold approx-
"Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) emphasized the importance of contracts that allow for randomization for
efficiency in their analysis. Such randomization is important for existence in their environment, but is not central
for the baseline efficiency results in our or their framework. To highlight this and to simplify the exposition, we
start with an environment that does not allow for such randomization. We then establish the equivalent results
when randomization is allowed (e.g., Theorem 5 generalizes Theorem 2, etc.).
'Nevertheless, the notion of efficiency we use for most of the analysis may be more relevant than this latter
weaker notion, since in a production economy the social planner can often achieve the allocations under full
monitoring by using taxes and subsidies. To simplify notation, we do not explicitly study such tax policies.
''See, for example, Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Golosov, Kocherlakota and
Tsyvinski (2003).
imately. Suppose for example that the worker's preferences are defined at two levels: the
worker has preferences over a number of needs (such as food, entertainment, procrastination,
vacation, health care and so on) and each one of these needs is satisfied by consumption of
various goods in the economy. Suppose also that there are only a few needs that interfere with
the worker's effort choice such as vacation, procrastination and health care. In particular, a
higher effort choice might make the worker enjoy vacations and procrastination less relative to
other needs (since she spends most of her time working) and enjoy health care more relative to
other needs (since the cost of effort decreases with level of health), but the worker's preferences
for other needs may not depend on effort level. Suppose also that employers can monitor the
consumption levels for the few needs that interfere with effort choice (but not necessarily the
consumption of the particular goods that make up these needs). This amounts to assuming
that firms can enforce how long a vacation the worker takes, how much time she spends in
the office, and how good a health care she receives. Under these assumptions, our Theorem 3
applies and shows that the equilibrium will be constrained optimal. This scenario thus con-
stitutes a counterexample to the conjectured suboptimality of competitive equilibria under
private information and anonymous trading, and suggests considerable caution in appealing to
the above-mentioned folk theorem. Moreover, in this example, the folk theorem would suggest
taxing the goods that provide procrastination services (such as TVs), but our results indicate
that this might be the wrong policy recommendation since firms already monitor the consump-
tion of TVs (and other procrastination goods) by making the workers come to the office during
work hours.
'
•
. . .
.
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As the above discussion clarifies, our paper is related to a number of literatures. The rela-
tionship of our paper to Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) and to Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986) has already been discussed. Another set of closely related papers are by Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986, 2008) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998), which establish
the generic inefficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with (exogenously-given) incom-
plete markets. Our work extends the Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis results to environments with
endogenously incomplete markets (because of moral hazard). It also highlights that in such
environments constrained optimality may. result if the appropriate subsets of goods are mon-
itored. Similar issues arise in other economies with price externalities due to endogenously
incomplete markets. For example, Kehoe and Levine (1993) provide results similar to ours
for an economy with participation constraints. Our paper is also related to Citanna and Vil-
lanacci (2000), which establishes generic inefficiency of equihbria for a moral hazard economy
with exclusive contractual relationships in which the principal has all the bargaining power.
Our work shows that their inefficiency result crucially depends on the assumption that the
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principal has the bargaining power. Given the separability assumptions they impose on pref-
erences, our results imply that the equilibrium would be efficient in the polar opposite case in
which the agent has all the "bargaining power," i.e. when insurance contracts are exclusive
and the insurance market is competitive.
, t,v.'; ,, ., , ' '
In addition to these works, the paper most closely related to our paper is Lisboa (2001),
which establishes the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria in the context of an economy
with moral hazard and fully separable utility. A number of key differences between our work
and Lisboa are worth emphasizing. First, Lisboa considers a special case of the model studied
here, in which utility functions are fully separable across all goods and effort and there is no
monitoring of consumption in any subset of goods. Second, Lisboa's analysis relies on the first-
order approach applying everywhere, which is restrictive and not used in our analysis. Third,
Lisboa's analysis contains neither our characterization results on inefficiency of comparative
equilibria nor our result on approximate efficiency.
There is also a large literature on various different aspects of moral hazard in general
equilibrium. Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) and Gottardi and Jerez (2007) discuss the prob-
lems that arise in general equilibrium economies with moral hazard because of potential non-
transferability of utihty. They show how Bertrand competition might lead to equilibria with
positive profits. This is an issue that also arises in our model and we provide sufficient con-
ditions (that are not very restrictive) for Bertrand competition to lead to zero profits. Bisin,
Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (2007) consider an alternative approach
to moral hazard in general equilibrium, where, in contrast to our setup, contracts are not
necessarily individualized. This introduces natural externalities across the actions of different
individuals signing the same type of contract.^
Finally, some of the same issues we emphasize in the context of general equihbrium also
arise in the pubUc finance and mechanism design literatures. See, for example, Hammond
(1987), Allen (1985), Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Guesnerie (1998), Cole and Kocherlakota
(2001), Werning (2001), Kocherlakota (2004), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), and Doepke and
TowTisend (2006). None of these studies derive results similar to our main theorems in this
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment, defines a
competitive equilibrium, and establishes the existence of equilibrium. Section 3 introduces the
notion of constrained optimality and provides sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium
is not constrained optimal. Section 4 introduces the notion of weak separability and presents
''Also related are recent papers considering adverse selection in general equilibrium, for example, Bisin and
Gottardi (1999, 2006) and Jerez (2003).
our main result, which shows that the equilibrium is constrained optimal when the preferences
are weakly separable. Section 5 introduces the environment with stochastic contracts and
generahzes the efficiency results to this setting. Section 6 presents our second main result,
which shows that the equilibrium is approximately constrained optimal when the preferences
are approximately weakly separable. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A.l discusses additional
results omitted from the main text, and Appendix A.2 contains the proofs of all the results
stated in the text.
2 Environment and Equilibrium
2.1 Preferences
We consider a static production economy with a finite set of goods denoted by G and a finite
set of (individual-specific) states of nature denoted by S. We use g E G and s € 5 to index
goods and states, and use |G| and j^l to denote the cardinality of these sets. There is a
continuum of individual workers, denoted by M, with measure normalized to 1. To simplify
the analysis and the exposition, we assume that all workers have identical utility and identical
production technology. In particular, each worker chooses an effort level e E E, where E =
{ei, .., e|£;|} C R is a finite set. The effort choice of the worker induces a probability distribution
\G\
over an endowment (production) vector y £ W_^_ . We represent this probability distribution
by the function q, whereby q^ (e) G [0, 1] is the probabihty of state s E S for the worker in
question when she exerts effort e (naturally with J^sesl^i^) ~ ^ ^°^ ^^' e E E). Each state
s e 5 is, in turn, associated with a production vector j/s E W_^ '. For each g, there exists s E S
such that j/f ^ 0, which ensures that each good g is in positive supply in some states. We also
assume throughout that the realization of states in S (conditional on effort) is independent
across individuals. Thus, with a law of large numbers type argument there is no aggregate
uncertainty.^
We assume that each worker has VNM preferences over consumption of goods and effort
choice represented by
U{x,e) = ^qs{e)u{xs,e),
seS
where x^ = (xl,...,x[ ) E W^ is the vector of consumption in state s and u () denotes the
state utility function. Throughout, we use the notation Xs = {xs)\geG to designate vectors.
The results generalize to multiple types straightforwardly provided that worker type is observable and
contractible.
See, for example, Bewley (1986) or Malinvaud (1973). Nevertheless, some care is necessary in defining the
right notion of integral in applying such a law of large numbers. The simplest approach, proposed by Uhlig
(1996), is sufficient here.
and X = {xi)\seS,geG to designate matrices. We refer to the pair (x, e) as an allocation, and let
I
CI V IdA = R|^ ' ' ' X £^ denote the set of allocations. We make the following standard assumption
on the utiUty function: , , .
, ,
•
.
Assumption Al (Preferences) The state utihty function u(-) is twice continuously differ-
entiable in Xs, strictly increasing in each if, and strictly concave in Xg.
Throughout, the effort choice of the worker is her private information, so there is a moral
hazard problem and employment contracts cannot be conditioned on effort choices. The re-
alized production vector is publicly observable and employment contracts can condition on
these reahzations. Motivated by the discussion in the introduction, we consider a partition
Q = {Gi, .., G\g\ } of the set of goods (i.e., a collection of disjoint subsets of goods the union of
which is equal to the set of all goods, G). The employment contracts can specify the worker's
expenditure w^ £ R+ on the monitoring subset Gm, for each m £ M = {l,..,\Q\]. The
goods within each monitoring subset Gm are traded in spot markets that operate after all
production vectors are realized (and at market clearing prices as described below). We use
w = {w^riseSmeM to denote the matrix where each element denotes the individual's expen-
diture on each monitoring subset at a given state. We denote the vector of prices by p G R\. .
We choose good 1 as the numeraire, i.e. p^ — 1. For any subset of commodities G' C G, we
denote by p the corresponding price sub-vector, and by x'^ the corresponding consumption
sub-matrix.
2.2 Firms and Employment Contracts
A large finite number of firms can sign employment contracts with the workers. We denote the
set of firms by J = {1, 2, .., | Jj}. Firms are owned by the workers and maximize the expected
profits. Since, as we will see shortly, in equilibrium firms will make zero profits, we do not
introduce additional notation to specify the allocation of their profits.
Throughout we impose exclusivity and assume that each worker can only contract with a
single firm. An employment contract between a firm and a worker gives the property rights over
the worker's production, y^, to the firm and specifies worker's expenditures, w = {wT}seSmeM^
and prescribes consumption levels for goods, x = {x^)\s^s,geG, and effort choice, e E E. Note
that at this point we are not allowing stochastic contracts, which would instead determine a
probability distribution over outcomes. We return to stochastic contracts in Section 5.
We denote a contract by the tuple c = {w,x,e), and we denote the set of contracts by
C = rI^I^'I^^I X A (where recall that A = rI^'''''^' x E denotes the set of allocations). Notice
that C is a subset of a finite dimensional space and its elements, denoted by c G C, are simply
vectors. An incentive compatible contract is c = (u;,a;,e) £ C such that the effort choice and
the level of consumption of goods are incentive compatible given prices p and wage schedule
w. More formally, this means that for a given market price vector p > 0,
(x, e) G arg max U{x,e) (1)
{x,e)eA
subject to ^sPs — '^T fo'^ each s and m.
We denote the set of incentive compatible contracts by C^{p).
The maximization problem in (1) can be conceptually divided into two parts. Given an
effort level e, the consumption choice at each state s is uniquely determined as the solution to:
Xs G arg max u{xs,e)
subject to x^^pf•" < w'^ for each m.
We denote the consumption choice at state s by the function Xj {ws,p,e), and the consump-
tion choice at all states by the function x{w,p,e). By Berge's Maximum Theorem and the
strict concavity of u(-) in x, the function x(-) is continuous in its arguments. The incentive
compatible effort choice is then a solution to the following problem:
e G argmax[7(x(ti;,p, e) ,e) . (2)
Since E is finite, this problem always has a solution. The solution is represented by a corre-
spondence e.[w,p). We also define the indirect utility Junction
y(c,p) = maxt/ (x(zt>,p, e) , e) -
.
. (3)
for each p > and c G C^{p). By Berge's Maximum Theorem, the correspondence e{w,p) is
upper hemicontinuous, and the indirect utility function is continuous in its arguments (here
recall that c G C\p) is simply a vector).
2.3 Worker's Contract Choice ' ^
Each individual worker v faces a menu of incentive compatible contracts, one from each firm,
{c (i^ijOI-gj, and she chooses the contract that maximizes her utility. The worker can also
reject all contract offers. In this case, she generates an alternative production vector y^ < ys in
each s (since she will be less productive without the firm). Since, as we will see, in equihbrium
the worker will never reject all contract offers, there is no loss of generahty in assuming that
Vs = Vs, and we adopt this assumption to simplify the notation. So when the worker rejects
all contract offers, she solves
max U (i.e.)
,
(4)
subject to XsP < VsP for each s. ,;,':,
Let (x, e) be a solution to the preceding problem, and define the contract c (:/, | p) =
((u;'"
= a;'^"p'^'") ,. ,x,e] as ifte outside option of the worker. Rejecting every contract
is equivalent for the worker to accepting the contract c(j/,0
j p).
Hence, a strategy for the worker i^ is & function J^:C (p)'"^' i-+ J U {0} that specifies the
index of the firm she chooses or if she chooses her outside option:
Ju
2.4 Firm's Problem
{c(i',j)}iej earg_max Vic {i^,j) ,p). ' (5)
'^•^-i jeJu{0}
We assume that firm j offers a continuum of incentive compatible contracts, one for each
worker, taking the price vector p, the contracts offered by other firms (c {i',j))
^j^ - ^j_r x,
and the worker strategies (J|y)t,£_/^ as given. ^'^ Formally, the contract offer of firm j is a
Lebesgue measurable function c(-,j) : [0,1] —> C' [p). Let C ic'{py '^'\ denote the set of
Lebesgue measurable functions from [0, 1] to C^ (p), and let 7r(c, p) denote the profit of the
firm from an accepted contract c = {i(j,x, e), given by: . ;
Z<K{{w,x,e),p) = Y^qs{e){ysp-
Note that the firm's profit from a contract that is not accepted is equal to 0. Hence, firm j
solves the following problem:
max
,
, /^ , , ,
Tr{c{v,j),p)dv. (6)
2.5 Definition of Equilibrium
Let us refer to the economy described in the previous section with E. In this section, we define
a competitive equilibrium for economy £ and show that such an equilibrium exists.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium in economy £ is a collection of contract offers
[c{v,j)\^^j
^^j^ by the firms, a collection of strategies for the workers {^u)^^j>^, a price vector
p, and accepted contracts, [w (i/) , x [v) , e {v)]^^j^, such that
'°To justify the assumption that firms take the price of goods as given, we could put an exogenous limit
on the measure of contracts a firm can sign (a capacity constraint). If the capacity constraint is sufficiently
small and the number of firms is sufficiently large, each firm will be too "small" to influence equilibrium prices
while there will be sufficiently many firms to provide each worker with employment contracts. This extension is
straightforwad, but we present the model without capacity constraints to simplify the exposition.
1. Workers' contract choice is optimal, i.e., for each v G J\f, the strategy J^ satisfies (5).
2. Firms maximize expected profits, i.e., for each j G J, the contract offer c{-,j) solves
problem (6).
3. Goods markets clear, i.e., for each g E G,
M
y^ qs{e{v))[y^^ — x^^[v))dv > 0, with equality if p^ > 0. (7)
',eS
2.6 Firm Competition and the Indirect Problem
To facilitate the characterization of equilibrium, we also impose the following assumptions.
Assumption A2 (Probability function) The probability function qs is strictly positive,
that is, qs (e) > for each s G S and e G E.
Assumption A3 (Local Transferability) There exists a monitoring subset Gi and func-
tions u^i () and w'^^'^i (•) such that
In addition, u'-'^ (•) satisfies:
lim
dxs
(8)
(9)
Assumption A2 is standard. Assumption A3 is less standard, but relatively weak. The
first part of the assumption, for example, will hold if there is one good which is completely
separable from effort choice, and consumption of which can be monitored by the firm. The
second part of Assumption A3 is a relatively weak form of the standard Inada condition (in
particular, it implies a minimum consumption requirement on the consumption vector, x^^
,
as opposed to separate requirements on the consumption of each good, xf ). This requirement,
along with Assumption A2, ensures that the worker's expenditure on the goods in Gi is strictly
positive at each state s, i.e., wl > 0. The first part of Assumption A3 ensures that the firm
can slightly increase (or decrease) the worker's expenditure on the goods in Gi while keeping
the incentive compatible effort level the same. Consequently, the assumption allows for at
least a small amount of utihty transfer between the worker and the firm, wliile respecting
the incentive compatibility constraints (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A. 2 for a formalization).
Without a condition that allows for this type of utihty transfer, Bertrand competition may not
drive profits to zero (see Bennardo and Chiappori, 2003). Since this problem is already well
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understood and is orthogonal to our main concerns, Assumption A4 enables us to focus on the
questions of interest for us. ' ' ' ' ' '. , '. , ;. . c - . : -,-
The following proposition provides an equivalent characterization for the equilibrium. In
particular, a collection of accepted contracts is part of an equilibrium if and only if all but a
measure zero of them maximize the utility of the worker subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint and a non-negative profit constraint for the firm. As with all the other proofs in
this paper, the proof of this Proposition is in Appendix A. 2.
Proposition 1. (The Indirect Problem) Consider an economy E that satisfies Assumptions
Al-AS. Then, the prices and accepted contracts, (p,c{v) = ['w{v) ,x{u) ,e{v)\^^jA, are part
of an equilibrium if and only if: . -
1. The contract c{v) is a solution to
max V(c,p) ' • (10) •
-.
. ceC'ip)
subject to 7r{c,p)>0, (H)
for all but a measure zero of i/ G M
.
2. The goods markets clear [cf. Eq. {7)j. . •
'
Moreover, at the solution to problem (10), the constraint (11) binds, that is, each firm
makes zero profits m equilibrium.
2.7 Existence of Equilibrium
The assumptions we made so far do not guarantee the existence of an equihbrium. If the
solution set to problem (10), denoted by S (p), is not upper hemicontinuous in the price vector
p, then the equilibrium may not exist. In particular, the correspondence S (p) could fail
to be upper hemicontinuous if the constraint set, C' (p), is discontinuous. In this setting,
the worker's incentive compatible effort choice can be discontinuous in the price vector p.
Nevertheless, because the elements of C^ {p) are contracts, c = {w, x, e) (and not simply the
effort choice, e), the correspondence C^ {p), which lies in the larger contract space C, could be
continuous even when effort choice is discontinuous in p. The following assumption is sufficient
to establish the continuity of the constraint set, C^ (p) (see Lemma 3 in Appendix A. 2).
Assumption A4 (Effort Targeting) For each e e E, there exists a vector of utiUty transfers
t e Rl'^l such that
^qs{e)ts>^qsie)t, for each ee E\{e} . (12)
ses ses
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This assumption is natural and quite weak. It loosely corresponds to the requirement
that firms should be able to induce (target) any level of effort if they wish to do so. It is
also not difficult to satisfy. For example, it holds when |£'| < \S\ and the probability vectors,
{Qs i^))ses ^°^ each e E E, are linearly independent. In the commonly studied case of two effort
levels, this assumption holds when there are at least two states and the efforts do not lead
to identical success probabilities. Assumption A4 ensures the continuity of C^ (p), which in
turn implies that the solution correspondence to problem (10), S (p), is upper hemicontinuous
(by a version of Berge's Maximum Theorem). The existence of equilibrium then follows from
standard arguments.
Theorem 1. (Existence of Equilibrium) Consider economy £ that satisfies Assumptions
A1-A4- There exists a competitive equilibrium for the economy E.
Remark 1. (The Role of Assumptions A3 and A 4) An alternative to imposing Assump-
tions A3 and A4 would be to assume continuous effort choice, e.g., E = [0, 1], and to make
sufficiently strong assumptions to ensure that the effort choice changes continuously in the
price vector p. The following set of sufficient conditions are typically adopted in general equi-
librium analyses of moral hazard economies with continuous effort (see, for example, Arnott
and Stiglitz, 1991, 1993, or Lisboa, 2001): (1) The state utihty function is fully separable
between consumption and effort choice, i.e., u {xs, e) = v [xg) — c (e) for some function v {) and
a cost function c(-). (2) There are only two individual states, i.e., S = {/i, /} (corresponding
to high output and low output). (3) The probability function q^ (e) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in e, and the cost function c(e) is strictly increasing and convex in e. Under
these conditions, it can be shown that the first-order approach is valid, which in turn implies
that the worker's effort choice is continuous in p. However, these conditions are too restrictive
for our purposes since they rule out nonseparable state utility functions (defined in Definition
3 below), which play a crucial role in our main efficiency results in Sections 3 and 4. Our
Assumptions A3 and A4 are considerably weaker than the standard assumptions, and as such,
they enable us to establish the existence of equilibrium for nonseparable as well as separable
state utility functions. The analytical difficulties that emerge in the setting with nonseparable
state utility functions have been emphasized by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988b, 1993). In this
light. Theorem 1 could also be viewed as a methodological contribution to general equilibrium
analyses of moral hazard economies.
It is also worth noting that allowing for stochastic contracts as in Prescott and Townsend
(1984a) does not bypass the need to impose Assumptions A3 and A4 (see Section 5). Intuitively,
allowing for stochastic contracts convexifies the incentive compatibility set, C' (p), which sim-
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plifies the analysis in some dimensions. However, convexifying a discontinuous correspondence
does not necessarily make it continuous. Hence, the essential difficulty for establishing the
existence of equilibrium remains in the setting with stochastic contracts. This difficulty does
not arise in the Prescott and Townsend (1984a) economy, because contracts directly prescribe
consumption levels for each good and thus endogenous prices do not affect the set of incentive
compatibiUty contracts. , , ;
3 Generic Inefficiency of Equilibrium
This section formalizes the folk theorem for imperfect information economies, by providing
sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is inefficient. We start by describing the
notion of efficiency used in our analysis.
An allocation in our setting, {x, e) £ A, is effort-incentive compatible if the effort choice is
optimal given the level of consumption prescribed, that is, if
• U {x,e) > U [x.e) for each, e £ E
.
We denote the set of effort-incentive compatible allocations with A-^ . An economy-wide alloca-
tion ([2: (f ) , e {i')]^,^j^ is effort-incentive compatible and feasible if {x [v) , e {v)) € A^ for each
v e M, and the resource constraints hold, that is,
/ V qs{e{v)) {yl - xiiiy)) dv > 0, for each g. (13)
Definition 2. An economy-wide allocation \x{u) ^e{v)\.^^j^ is constrained (Pareto) op-
timal if it is effort-incentive compatible and feasible, and there does not exist another
effort-incentive compatible and feasible economy-wide allocation [x{v) ,e{v)]^^^i^ such that
U {x {v)
,
e {v)) > U {x {1^) ,e {u}) for all u £ M, with strict inequality for a positive measure of
Consider an equilibrium of the economy E with price vector and accepted contracts,
(p, \w {v) , X {v) , e {'^)]^(zj>j)- We say that the equilibrium is constrained optimal if the economy-
wide allocation [x (p) ,e{u)]^czj\f ^s constrained optimal.
Remcirk 2. (Full Monitoring by the Social Planner) Our notion of efficiency provides the
social planner with the same informational constraints as the firms but with better contracting
(monitoring) technology. In particular, the planner cannot observe the effort choice of the
worker, but can specify the consumption of all goods in the employment contract. This notion
of optimahty is arguably strong. Nevertheless, it is natural for us for two reasons. First,
this notion helps us to develop our main point more succinctly. For example, our main result
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(Theorem 3) delineates a range of benchmark situations in which the equilibrium is efficient in
this strong sense. Second, the social planner can approximate a constrained optimal outcome
according to our definition using more limited instruments, i.e., a tax and transfer system.
For example, the government can reduce the consumption of a particular good by levying a
linear tax on that good (though a tax and transfer system is not equivalent to full monitoring:
Appendix A. 1 considers a weaker notion of optimality and provides an example economy that
is constrained suboptimal according to the strong optimality notion, but not according to this
weaker optimality notion).
The main result in this section establishes sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium
is constrained suboptimal. These conditions are related to the notions of nonseparability and
no full insurance, which we define next.-"-
Definition 3. Consider an allocation {x,e). The state utility function is nonseparable (not
weakly separable) at (x,e) if there exists a state s, a monitoring subset Gm, <md two goods
91 ,92 6 Cm such that the marginal rate of substitution between g\ and §2 at state s changes
when effort level is modified, that is ,'',;.
du (.3, e) /dxf ^ du (X., e) /^xf ^"' '^"^
eeE\{e}.
There is no full insurance at {x,e), if there exists a good g £ G and two states 5i,S2 G S
such that the marginal rate of substitution for good g between states si,S2 is not equal to 1,
that is
du{xs^^^e)Jdxi^
du{xs2,e) /dx% ' ' '
The next theorem is our main inefficiency result. It shows that the equilibrium is con-
strained suboptimal whenever the state utility function is nonseparable and there is no full
insurance at the equilibrium allocation for a positive measure of workers.
Theorem 2. (Nonseparability and Inefficiency) Consider an economy £ that satisfies
Assumptions A1-A4- Let [p, [w [v) ,x{v) ,e {v))^^j^\ denote the prices and accepted contracts
in an equilibrium. Suppose that there is a positive measure set J\f* C A^ such that for each v €
M* , the state utility function is nonseparable and there is no full insurance at the equilibrium
allocation {x {u) , e (v)) . Then, the equilibrium is not constrained optimal.
The intuition for the result is closely related to double deviations by the worker, that is,
deviations in which a worker switches to a different effort level and reoptimizes her consumption
"As Definition 4 below makes it clear, "nonseparable" preferences are the converse of "weakly separable"
preferences. We use the terminology "nonseparable" since its easier to use than "not weakly separable" or
"weakly nonseparable". -
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of nonmonitored goods for the new effort level. When the preferences are nonseparable and
there is no full insurance at the equiUbrium allocation, double deviations bind in the incentive
compatibihty constraints. That is, they prevent firms from providing more insurance to the
workers. A social planner who can also prescribe the consumption of nonmonitored goods
is not constrained by double deviations, and can therefore provide better insurance without
violating the incentive compatibility constraints.
It is also worth noting that Theorem 2 is a generic inefficiency result, since nonseparable
utility functions are open and dense (or weakly separable utility functions, as defined in Defini-
tion 4, are nowhere dense) in the set of all continuous utility function (with the sup norm). Put
differently, if u is weakly separable and u is nonseparable, then eu + {1 — e) u is nonseparable
for any £ G (0, 1).
The next example illustrates the intuition of Theorem 2.
Example 1. Suppose that there are two states, S = {h,l}, corresponding to high output
and low output, and two goods, G = {1,2}. The monitoring partition is given by G = {G},
which implies that the firm can only specify wages and otherwise cannot monitor worker's
consumption. For simplicity, consider a partial equilibrium setting in which the relative price
of the goods is fixed and is equal to 1, i.e., suppose p^ = p^ = 1.^- Suppose there are two effort
levels, i.e., E = {0,1}, which respectively correspond to shirking and working. Assiune the
firm makes zero profits in the low output state and positive profits in the high output state,
that is, TT; = yip = 0, and tt/j = y^p > 0. Assume qk (e = 1) = 1/2 and g/, (e = 0) = 0. Assume
also that good 2 is relatively more complementary to leisure than good 1. More specifically,
the worker's state utility function is given by:
.
,
., u{xs,e)=\n(^xl+(^^ + {l-eijxi^. (14)
Note that the worker enjoys good 2 relatively more (in comparison to good 1) when she does not
work, and relatively less when she works. Consider a social planner that chooses the allocation
((x^, f|,f j^, x^) ,e), subject to effort-incentive compatibility and resource constraints. It can
be seen that the social planner implements e = 1 and provides the worker with the consumption
of only good 1, i.e., she chooses x\ = if = 0. Moreover, given that the worker does not consume
good 2, the state utiUty function in (14) imphes that there is no incentive problem. Thus, the
''The partial equilibrium setting is a special case of our model in which there is a linear production technol-
ogy (that operates without moral hazard considerations) which can convert the two goods to each other. To
simplify the notation, we present our main results in an environment without this type of production technology.
Appendix B, which is available on request, shows that all of our results continue to hold when we introduce
a general (potentially nonlinear) production technology that is not subject to moral hazard. Also, again to
simplify the exposition, in this example we use functional forms that do not satisfy Assumptions A2 and A3.
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social planner provides the worker with full insurance. That is, the worker's consumption of
the first good is given by:
il = i] =
^,
(15)
and the worker's utility is given by
^(^.^) = 5'"(t) + ^My)-4y)- (i«
Next consider a firm that offers a wage contract {wfijWi). It can be seen that the social
planner's full insurance solution is not incentive compatible. That is, given the wages just
enough to consume the bundle (15), the worker would instead not work and consume a different
bundle. Since In (^) < In (5^), the worker can increase her utility with a double deviation
in which she changes her effort choice and reoptimizes her consumption for the new effort
decision. The firm will instead offer the wage contract [wh^wi) that is the solution to the
following equations: ' _ .
(Budget constraint),
- In {wh) + ;t In [wi] > In ( -Wh 1 (Incentive compatibility).
The equilibrium wages and consumption are given by: ' .
Wh = Y^TTh, xl = Wh, x\ = 0,and wi = jo'^h,xj = wi, xf = 0. (17)
The equilibrium utility is given by: >
//(.,e) = iln(l..)+lln(l..)=ln(l..). (18)
Comparing Eqs. (17)-(18) with (15)-(16), note that "the firm is only partially insuring the
worker, and the contract offered by the firm is strictly worse for the worker than the allocation
offered by the social planner.
Theorem 2 establishes the inefficiency of equilibrium under conditions on the equilibrium
allocation. A natural question is whether- there are any economies for which these conditions
hold. To address this question. Theorem 8 in Appendix A.l characterizes a class of economies
in which any equilibrivim is constrained optimal. The result essentially provides conditions
on the preferences and the technology such that Theorem 2 applies at any equilibrium. To
ensure that the equilibrium allocation of a worker always features less than full insurance,
we assume that there exists a shirking effort level which is always preferred by tlie worker
under full insurance, and which yields the firm (almost) zero profits. To ensure that every
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equilibrium allocation satisfies the nonseparability property, we assume that there exists a
monitoring subset Gm and two goods gi,g2 £ Gm such that the marginal rate of substitution
between gi and 52 always change monotonically in the effort level.
Theorems 2 and 8 provide some support for the folk theorem for the inefficiency of the
equilibrium. Recall, however, that these theorems rely on a strong notion of optimality which
essentially provides the social planner with a better monitoring technology than the firms (cf.
Remark 2). Theorems 2 and 8 are silent on whether a social planner who is also constrained
by the same monitoring technology can implement such a Pareto improvement. To address
this issue, Appendix A.l introduces a weaker notion of optimality which constrains the social
planner with the same monitoring technology as the firms. This appendix also provides an
example economy with nonseparable utility, which is constrained suboptimal as implied by
Theorem 8, but is weakly constrained optimal. The example shows that the inefficiency of
equilibrium established in Theorems 2 and 8 in part stems from the strong notion of optimality
wliich gives the social planner a technological advantage in monitoring. This suggests that care
must be taken in invoking these theorems. / -
4 Efficiency of Equilibrium under Weak Separability
We next provide our main result, which is the converse of Theorem 2. In particular, the
result shows that the equihbrium is constrained optimal when worker preferences are weakly
separable. The next definition formalizes the notioir of weak separability.
Definition 4. The state utility function u(-) is weakly separable if, for any monitoring
subset Gm o,nd two goods gi,g2 G Gm, ihs marginal rate of substitution between gi and 32 is
independent of effort level. That is,
du{xs,e) /dxf du{xs,e) /dxf \g\ , ~ ^ rp nn\
du[xs,e)/dxf = du{x,^e)/dxf ^"' '"''' ''^''~ " ^^ "^ ^ ^^ '^"' ^'^ " ^^ ^^'^
Note that the state utility function is weakly separable if and only if it is not nonseparable
at any allocation (x, e) G A. Our next result shows that weak separability is sufficient for the
competitive equilibrium to be constrained Pareto optimal.
Theorem 3. (Efficiency under Weak Separability) Consider an economy £ that satisfies
Assumptions A1-A4- Assume also that the state utility function u(-) is weakly separable. Then,
any equilibrium of the economy £ is constrained optimal.
The intuition of this result is that, under weak separability, the social planner chooses
for the worker the consumption bimdle which the worker would have chosen by herself in
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the anonymous trading market. Hence, there is no benefit to additional monitoring, and
competition among firms leads to the allocations that the social planner would have chosen.
A complementary intuition is that double deviations in which the worker changes effort level
and reoptimizes her consumption bundle accordingly are not valuable. This further implies
that the relative price changes caused by other contracts in the economy does not change the
insurance-incentive trade-off for a worker, rendering pecuniary externalities ineffective. We
demonstrate this theorem with a simple example in which preferences are fully separable.
Example 2. Consider the same setup as in Example 1 with two differences. First, to emphasize
that price externalities do not create inefficiencies in this setting, we consider more general
relative prices than in Example 1, that is, we consider the price vector (p^ = l,p^ € R-).) (we
continue to assume that the prices are fixed). Second, we assume that the worker's state utility
function is given by
u{xs,e) = u"'P{v{xl,xl),e)
,
where u^^^ (v, e) is a scalar valued function that is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
V and decreasing in e, and v (x^jX^) is a scalar valued fimction that is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments (a particular instance is u^^P {v, e) = In [v) — e and
V [xl,xl) = { {x\) = + (ig) ^ j
*"
for some e > 0). Here, the inner function v {x\,x1^ can
be thought of as the consumption level of a particular "need," which is satisfied by consuming
goods 1 and 2. The outer function u*^^ {v, e) gives the worker's utility corresponding the level
of the need, v, and the effort choice, e. Note that the state utility function, u(-), is weakly
separable, since , . ,
du [xs, e) /dxl ^ dv {xl,xl) /dx\
du{xs,e)ldxl dv{xl,x1) /dxl' " '
'
which is independent of the effort choice. "
Consider first a planner who determines an effort-incentive compatible allocation
((x^, Xj^,x^,a:p)
,
e) for each worker. Suppose, for simplicity, that the planner offers every
worker the same employment allocation (the result in Theorem 3 is more general and does not
rely on this assumption). The planner maximizes the representative worker's utility subject to
effort-incentive compatibility and resource constraints, that is:
max qH{e)u''P{v{xlxl),e) + {l-qH{e))u^'P{v{x],xf),e)
{x,e)SA
subject to '^qs{e){xl+p^x1) = ^qs{e)TTs,
seS seS :_
U {x, e)>U (x, e) for all e £ £^.
To solve this problem, the planner computes the value from implementing any e G E. The
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planner then implements the effort level that yields the highest utiUty to the worker. Similar
to the analysis in Grossman and Hart (1983), the social planner's problem is simplified in view
of the weak separability of the state utility function. In particular, the planner's problem is
equivalent to first deciding how much of the need to provide in each state, Vs, and then deciding
the optimal consumption bundle that provides this level of the need. Hence, the optimal utihty
from implementing e £ E is given by
max qh{e)u''P{vh,e) + {l-qh{e))u'''P{vi,e) (20)
subject to Y^qs{e){xl+p'^xl) =^qsie)TTs
s€S ses
Y. 1^ (^) ^"'' (^'^' ^~) ^ E 9^ (^) ^"^ (^'^ ^) ^°' all e G E,
seS s€S
and two additional constraints v (i^,a;^) — v^ and v (^xj,xf) = vi.
Note that, given Vs, the planner would like to minimize the cost of providing this level of
the need. That is, for each s £ {/i, I], the vector x^ is the solution to:
Wpi {vs) = min x] + p x
xseK |G|
1
, J2-2
s
subject to V (^xl,x'l) = Vs.
This is a strictly convex minimization problem that provides a one-to-one relationship between
Wpi () and the optimum choice of the consumption vector Xg- By duality, the optimum vector
Xs also maximizes v (x^,^^) subject to the expenditure being not greater than Wpi (u^). Using
these observations, problem (20) can be rewritten as
max E 9^ (^~) r '^^^ , ""' (^ (^5,5^) , e) (21)
subject to ^ qs (e) Wpi {vs) = ^ ?s (e) t^
seS
y^orrcrfls (e) I maxf „igi , , o-o ,- .^ u^^^ (v (xl.x'i) ,e) ] >
^.cc9s (e) I maxr igi , , o o , ,i w^^^ (u (ij, z?l , e) | for each e £ £.
Next consider the problem of a firm offering a wage contract {Wg,Wb}- To implement effort
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level e £ E, the firm will solve
max ^ qs (e) max u^'^p {v {xlx^) , e) 1 (22)
subject to ^ Qs (e) it;^ = ^ g^ (e) tt^
Eses<ls (e) (^max|.^^j^K;i
,
ji+p2j2<,,^} ^'^^ (^ (^l.^') ,e) j for each e e £;.
A comparison of problems (21) and (22) shows that they are equivalent. Consequently, the
social planner and the firm will choose to implement the same eff'ort level, e, and the worker
will receive the same utility in each case. Hence, in this example, monitoring is not valuable,
and a firm that can only ofi'er a wage contract provides incentives as well as a social planner
who can monitor worker's consumption.
The analysis in this example also suggests a general class of preferences that satisfies the
weak separability condition. Suppose that the state utihty function can be written as
u{x,,e) = u^^P [v' {x^^)y (:r?=) ,.., J^^l (xf'^') ,e) , ' (23)
where u^^^ (u^, u^,
..,
u'^l, e) is a scalar valued function which is strictly increasing and strictly
\G I
concave in its first \M\ arguments, and for each m, v"^ : W_^. '"' i—> M is a scalar valued function
which is increasing and concave in its arguments. This functional form is intuitive, as it implies
that the worker receives utility over a number of higher order needs (such as food, entertain-
ment, procrastination, vacation, health care, education etc.) each of which is provided by the
consumption of a distinct set of goods. Clearly, the state utility function in (23) is weakly
separable. Thus, Theorem 3 implies that equihbria of economies in which preferences can be
represented as in (8) are constrained optimal. This analysis the suggests that, if firms can
monitor the consumption of broad aggregates that interfere with effort choice, then the equi-
librium will be efficient even though firms are unable to monitor workers' exact consumption
choices.
•"
5 Equilibrium and EfRciency with Stochastic Contracts
This section extends our setup to allow for contracts with random outcomes, briefiy "stochas-
tic contracts." Allowing for randomization can be beneficial in this economy because of the
nonconvexity of problem (2) in Section 2 (e.g., Prescott and Townsend, 1984a, 1984b, Arnott
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and Stiglitz, 1988a). Our analysis in this section shows that allowing for stochastic contracts
does not change the efficiency properties of this economy. In particular, analogues of our main
results, Theorems 2 and 3, apply for the economy with stochastic contracts.
Given a finite dimensional space Z, we let B {Z) denote the Borel cr-algebra of Z and
V (Z) denote the set of probability measures over (Z, B (Z)). We endow P (Z) with the weak*
topology. A stochastic allocation in our setting is a probability measure t] over the allocation
space
(
A = M.\. x E,B{A)]. The worker's utihty from a stochastic allocation tj is denoted
by U^ (77), and it is equal to /, ^^^^ U {x, e) drj. Similarly, a stochastic contract is a probability
measm-e, j.l £ V{C), over the contract space iC = Kl,. x A,B[C^\. Given a stochastic
contract /i, we let M|(i,e) S V {A) denote the marginal measure over the allocation space A.
Depending on when the contract uncertainty is resolved, a stochastic contract \i can be
interpreted as having either ex-ante or ex-post randomization. With ex-post randomization,
the contract uncertainty is resolved after the effort decision is made, that is, the worker chooses
an effort level and then learns which contract she will receive. With ex-ante randomization, the
contract uncertainty is resolved before the effort decision is made, i.e., the worker learns her
contract before she chooses an effort level (see, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988a, for further discussion
and the role of each type of randomization). For analytical and notational convenience, we
analyze the case with only ex-ante randomization. All of the results in this section generaUze
to the case with both ex-ante and ex-post randomization.^'^
Given the assumption of only ex-ante randomization, a stochastic contract 11 is incentive
compatible if and only if its support lies in the set of deterministic incentive compatible con-
tracts, that is, supp[ji) C C {p). Equivalently, an incentive compatible stochastic contract is
a probability measure fi £ V [C^ {?)) The expected utility of the worker and the expected
profits of the firm are respectively given by Jqii„) V {c,p) d/x and /(^// \ tt (c,p) dfi. As in the
deterministic case, each worker i' faces a menu of incentive compatible contracts < tJ-iuj) \ i
and chooses the contract that maximizes her utility. Each firm j offers a continuum of con-
tracts to maximize its expected profit, taking the workers' strategies and other firms' contract
offers as given. We denote the economy with stochastic contracts with £^, and we define the
equilibrium for this economy as follows.
Definition 5. A competitive equilibrium in economy £^ is a collection of incentive compat-
ible contract offers < i^-t^ j) \ by the firms, a collection of strategies for workers, [J^j ^,
a price vector p, allocations [/^yji^gyv" ' •s^cft that: workers' contract choice is optimal, films max-
' It is well known that ex-post randomization in this setting could be useful to provide the worker with
additional incentives (see Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988a). However, as noted by Bennardo and Chiappori (2003),
this additional incentive provision does not interfere with the existence or efficiency properties of equilibrium.
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imize expected profits, and goods markets clear, that is, for each g:
/ / "S^ qs{e){yl - xl)dii^dv>Q, with equality for p^ > Q. (24)
Jj\f J(w,x,e)eC'(p)'^g
The following result is the counterpart of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 with stochastic
contracts.
Theorem 4. (Existence of Equilibrium with Stochastic Contracts) Consider an econ-
omy £^ that satisfies Assumptions Al-AJ^. There exists a competitive equilibrium for the
economy £^. The prices and accepted contracts, (p, [Mi/]i>eA/')' '^^^ P'^''^^ °f '^'^ equilibrium if and
only if:
1. For all hut a measure zero of workers v G M , the contract /i^ is a solution to
max / V(c,p)dLi (25)
subject to / TT {c,p)dfj,>0. (26)
Jc'(p) .
2. The goods markets clear [cf. Eq. (24)/.
Moreover, at the solution to Problem (25), the profit constraint (26) binds, that is, every
firm makes zero profits m equilibrium. .. •,
Analysis of the efficiency of the equilibrium closely parallels the case with deterministic
contracts. First, we provide the analogous definition of constrained optimality with stochastic
contracts.
Given the assumption of only ex-ante randomization, a stochastic allocation rj is effort-
incentive compatible if and only if the support of rj lies in the set of deterministic effort-incentive
compatible allocations, that is, r; £ P {^^)- ^n economy-wide stochastic allocation \'n,j\^^j^ is
effort-incentive compatible and feasible if and only if 77^ 6 P {/^^) for each u and the resource
constraints hold: '
/ / Tqs{e)(yi-xl)dr^,dv>{}ioxe^chg. (27)JAfJ{x,e)eA'^
Definition 6. An economy-wide stochastic allocation \ri^]j^^j^ is constrained optimal if it
is effort-incentive compatible and feasible, and there does not exist another effort-incentive
compatible and feasible economy-wide allocation [fli,]^i^j^ such that U^ (t)^) > U^ (7?^) for all
u £ N with strict inequality for a positive measure of v.
Consider an equilibrium of the economy 8^ with the prices and accepted contracts,
{pAi^u]u€J\f)- ^^ ^^-y ^^^^ *^^ equilibrium is constrained optimal if the economy-wide allo-
cation \^i'i,\(x,e)\ (iKf ^^ constrained optimal.
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Our next result is the analogue of Theorem 2 for stochastic contracts, and establishes
sufBcient conditions under which the equilibrium is not constrained optimal. To state the result,
we generahze the notions of nonseparability and no full insurance to stochastic allocations.
Definition 7. Consider a stochastic allocation 77 and a compact set A* C A such that t] {A*) >
0. The state utility function u(-) is nonseparable at {ri,A*), if there exists a state s, a
monitoring subset Gm, ond two goods 51,52 £ Gm such that the marginal rate of substitution
between g\ and 52 o^ state s changes when the effort level is modified, that is,
du{x.,e)/dxf
'^
du{x.,e)ldxf
for each [x,e) e A and e e E\{e} .
There is no full insurance at {r],A*) if there exists a good g E G and two states Si,S2 6 S
such that • . :" - - . . - / , .
The following is our main inefficiency result for the economy with stochastic contracts.
Theorem 5. (Inefficiency under Stochastic Contracts) Consider an economy E^ that
satisfies Assumptions A1-A4- Let (p, [/^t/]^gj\/) denote the prices and accepted contracts in an
equilibrium. Suppose that there is a positive measure set Af* C Af such that for each v £ J\f*
,
there exists a compact set A* C A with tJ-i/\{x,e) (^*) > such that the state utility function
is nonseparable and there is no full insurance at (Miy|(a;,e)i ^*)- Then, the equilibrium is not
constrained optimal.
We next provide the analogue of Theorem 3 for stochastic contracts. The following result
shows that, when the utility function is weakly separable, any equilibrium with stochastic
contracts is constrained optimal.
Theorem 6. (Efficiency under Stochastic Contracts) Consider economy £^ that satisfies
Assumptions AI-A4. Assume also that the state utility function u () is weakly separable. Then,
any equilibrium of the economy £^ is constrained optimal.
6 Approximate EfRciency of Equilibrium
As noted in Section 3, weak separability is a nongeneric property (in the sense that any weakly
separable utility function will become nonseparable after a small perturbation). However,
there is also a sense in which such genericity results may not be relevant for understanding the
economic importance of certain types of inefficiencies. In particular, such genericity results do
not preclude the possibihty that in most economically relevant situations equilibria might be
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"approximately" efScient. In the present context, weakly separable utility functions might be
a fairly good approximation to most economic situations (including almost all cases considered
in applied work). Thus, what might be relevant is whether there are significant inefficiencies
when there are only small deviations from such weak separability. In this section, we investigate
this question. We introduce a notion of approximate efficiency (e-constrained optimality) and
show that when the economy is "close to" an alternative economy with weakly separable utility
functions, its equilibrium will be approximately constrained optimal.
Definition 8. For each e > 0, an economy-wide allocation [r]^]i,^j^ is e -constrained optimal
if it is effort-incentive compatible and feasible, and there does not exist another effort-incentive
compatible and feasible economy-wide allocation [f)u]^^j^ such that U^ (7)^,) > U^ {r]^,) + e for
all V S A/", with strict inequality for a positive measure of v G J\f
Consider an equilibrimn of the economy £^ with the prices and accepted contracts,
(Pi [Mi/li/eA/')- ^^ ^^-y ^^^^ ^^^ equilibrium is e-constrained optimal if the economy-wide al-
location [fi^lr^g^^ ^ is e- constrained optimal. .
The notion of e-constrained optimality is a generalization of the notion of constrained
optimality (cf. Definition 2) since the two notions are equivalent for e = 0. We next introduce
the notion of a perturbation of the state utility function. Recall that, by Assumption A3, the
state utility function has the representation ', '
u{xs,e)=u^' (xfi) +u^\^i (a;f^^^e)
,
for some functions u'^^ (•) and u'^^'^i (•). For simplicity, we keep the transferable component,
u^^ (), unchanged and we focus on perturbations of -u'-'^^i () (this is without loss of any
generahty). Let u*-'' () denote a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
and bounded function, and consider the set of state utihty functions: ., ' ,
^^ "
I
( u^\^^ : R^^^' X E u satisfies Assumption Al and is bounded.
Note that any state utility function u G U satisfies Assumptions Al and A3. We endow the set
U with the sup norm, which makes U into a normed vector space, and thus a metric space. ^"^
For a state utility function u G ZY, we let B {u,S) = {u & U
\
\\u — u\\ < 5} denote the
5 neighborhood of u. When d > 0, the functions in B (u, 5) can be thought of as small
The assumption that u is bounded is without loss of generahty, because each worker's production of each
good g is bounded above by maxsgsj/f, which implies that the utility function can be restricted to a bounded
consumption set. More specifically, for any unbounded state utility function, u, there exists a bounded state
utility function, u, which agrees with u on the relevant consumption set and which leads to the same equilibrium
set.
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perturbations of the function u. If v. is weakly separable, then the state utility functions in
B (u, 5) are close to being weakly separable. Our next result shows that equilibria of economies
with utility functions in B (u, 5) are approximately efficient (e-constrained optimal).
Theorem 7. (Approximate Efficiency) Let \S^ (w)] ^ denote the class of economies that
satisfy Assumptions A1-A4 and that differ only in the state utility function, u e U. Consider
a weakly separable state utility function u £ U. For any e > 0, there exists 6 > such that, if
u E B (u, 6), then any equilibrium of the economy £ {u) is e-constrained optimal.
We provide a sketch proof of this result, which is completed in Appendix A. 2. We first
present a social planner's problem for this economy, which is useful to characterize the efficiency
properties of the equilibrium. Consider the problem of maximizing an (equal) weighted utihty
of the workers subject to effort-incentive compatibility and resource constraints:
max / / U {x,e)dfjjjdu (28)
subject to / / \^ qs (e) (yf — xl)dr]^,dv > 0.
Jn J{x,e)eA' f^
Note that problem (28) is a linear optimization problem and the constraint set, V {A^), is
convex. Hence, problem (28) has the same optimal value as the following simpler problem:
max / U{x,e)di) (29)
veV{A') J{x,e)eA!
subject to / 'S2qs{e){ys -^i)d'fi>0,
J{x,e}eA'
^g5
where t) e V (A^) is the average measure defined by:
V (a) = f r,^ (a) dv for each i £ S [A') . (30)
In other words, the social planner can be thought of as choosing a single stochastic allocation
to maximize a worker's expected utihty subject to resource constraints. Let J7p;^„„g^ [u) denote
the optimal value of problem (29) for the economy with the state utihty function u G U.
The next lemma characterizes approximate constraint optimality of the equilibrium by
comparing the optimal value of the social planner's problem (29) with the optimal value of the
equilibrium problem (25). To state the result, let U^^ (p, ") denote the value of problem (25)
when the price vector is given by p and the state utility function is u £ U.
Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium of the economy E^ with the price vector p. For any £ > 0,
the equilibrium is e-constrained optimal if and only if U5^^^^^ (u) G [U^ {p, u) , U^^ (p, u) + e].
In particular, the equilibrium is constrained optimal if and only if US^^^^^ {u) = U^^ [p, u).
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Given this lemma, Theorem 7 intuitively follows from Theorem 6 and the continuity prop-
erties of problems (25) and (29). To see this, first note that Theorem 6 imphes that any
equilibrium of the economy £ iu) is constrained optimal. By Lemma 1, this implies
UXnner{'a) = U^,{p,u), (31)
for any equilibrium price vector p of the economy E (u). Next, the analysis in Appendix A.
2
establishes that a version of Berge's Maximum Theorem applies to problem (29), and thus
^Sanner (^) ^^ ^ continuous function of u. Similarly, Ug„ (p, u) is a continuous function of
{p,u). Moreover, it can be seen that the equilibrium price correspondence,
P (u) = <p e M+
I
p is an equilibrium price vector of £ (u) >
,
(32)
is upper hemicontinuous in u. These observations, along with Eq. (31), imply that U^^^^^^, (u)
and U^ (p, u) are close to each other for a state utility function, u, that lies in a neighborhood
of u. Appendix A.2 formalizes and completes this argument, establishing a proof of Theorem
7.
Theorem 7 also highlights why the notion of generic inefficiency is not always economically
useful. Take the set of economies corresponding to utility functions in the set B {u, 5) for some
5 > 0. With the same argument as above, weakly separable utility functions are nowhere
dense within the set B{u,5). But our result shows that all of the corresponding economies
have equihbria that are approximately efficient.
Remark 3. (The Role of Stochastic Contracts in Approximate Efficiency) Note
that Theorem 7 concerns the economy £^ with stochastic contracts, and we do not have an
analogous approximate efficiency result for an economy £ with deterministic contracts. We
conjecture that the result generalizes to economy £, but this conjecture is not straightforward
to prove.
The proof of Theorem 7 does not generalize to economy £, mainly because there appears
to be no analogue of Lemma 1 in that setting. In particular, due to the nonconvexity of the
set of incentive compatible contracts, C (p), the Pareto frontier of economy £ is not neces-
sarily characterized as the solution to a weighted social planner's problem. One can construct
example economies in which the equilibrium is constrained optimal; but neither problem (28)
nor problem (29) (nor any other weighted social planner's problem) yields the worker the same
utihty as the equilibrium. Since our proof of Theorem 7 exploits the continuity properties of the
social planner's problem, this proof does not generalize to economy £. Stochastic contracts are
useful in this context because they convexity the set of incentive compatible contracts, which
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in turn enables us to characterize constrained optimality using a social planner's problem (as
formalized by Lemma 1).
7 Conclusion
This paper investigated the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with private in-
formation. Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) establish the constrained optimality of com-
petitive equilibrium in such environments when (insurance, employment or credit) contracts
can fully specify consumption bundles. Though important, these results are not apphcable
to situations in which individuals are allowed to trade in anonymous markets. We view such
anonymous trachng to be an essential feature of competitive equilibria. Less is known about the
structure and efficiency of competitive equihbria in the presence of such anonymous trading.
A "folk theorem" originating in the work of Stiglitz and coauthors maintains that compet-
itive equihbria are always or "genericaUy" inefficient in such environments. This folk theorem
has widespread appUcability in both applied models and in policy discussions, though it has not
been formally investigated. This paper critically reevaluates this folk theorem in the context
of a general equihbrium economy with moral hazard. In our economy, fo-ms offer contracts
to workers who choose an effort level that is private information and affects the probability
distribution of endowment and production vectors. We establish the existence of a competitive
equilibriimi and characterize some of its properties.
To investigate the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium, we introduce a mon-
itoring partition such that employment contracts can specify expenditures over subsets in
the partition but camiot regulate how this expenditm^e is subdivided among the commodities
within a subset. We say that preferences are nonseparable (or not weakly separable) when the
marginal rate of substitution across commodities within a subset in the partition depends on
the effort level. We prove that the equihbrium is always inefficient when a competitive equilib-
rium allocation involves less than full insurance and preferences are nonseparable. While this
result is consistent with the folk theorem on the inefficiency of competitive equilibrium, our
main result shows why such inefficiency does not always arise and can be mitigated by partial
monitoring. We show that when there is weak separability in preferences, a condition satisfied
by preference is used in most applied theory work, competitive equilibria with moral hazard
are constrained optimal, in the sense that a social planner who can regulate and monitor all
consumption levels cannot improve over these competitive allocations. We also show that
equilibria in economies that have utility functions that are approximately weakly separable
will be approximately efficient. These results imply that the strong suboptimality claims of
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the folk theorem for competitive equiUbria in private information economies may be somewhat
exaggerated. At the very least, considerable care is necessary in concluding that competitive
equilibria are inefficient and government intervention is necessary without knowing the details
of preference and information structure.
Our results also emphasize that the efficiency properties of competitive equihbria depend
on the monitoring partition, which raises the question of how the monitoring partition is de-
termined in practice. In related work, we develop a framework for the analysis of competitive
equilibria in which firms pay a cost to choose which subsets of commodities and actions to
monitor. Among other things, this framework shows that endogenous monitoring will create
another force towards efficiency. In particular, additional welfare loss in equilibrium compared
to the constrained efficient allocation is bounded above by the cost of monitoring a particular
partition (which depends on the worker's preferences). This further implies that, when the
cost of monitoring this partition is sufficiently small, the competitive equilibrium is approxi-
mately constrained optimal, despite the costs of monitoring that it incurs (relative to the social
planner who does not incur them). This result reinforces our point that considerable care is
necessary in invoking the folk theorem about the inefficiency of competitive equilibria with
private information.
A Appendices
A.l Omitted Results.
: \
The appendix presents results omitted from the main text.
Class of econoinies in which any equilibrium is inefficient. Theorem 2 in the main
text estabhshed sufficient conditions under which the equihbrium allocation is constrained
suboptimal. The next result identifies a class of economies in which any equihbrium satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 2, and thus, is inefficient. To ensure that the equilibrium always
features less than full insurance, we assume that there exists a shirking effort level which is
always preferred by the worker under full insurance, and which yields the firm (almost) zero
profits. To ensure that every equilibriurri has the nonseparability property, we assume that
there exists two goods within the same monitoring partition such that the marginal rate of
substitution between the goods change monotonically in the effort level. The result then follows
from Theorem 2 (proof omitted). .- .
Theorem 8. (Sufficient Conditions For Inefficiency) Consider a class of economies
[£ (^)]gg(o I) which differ only in the parameter 6 defined below. Suppose that
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1. There exists an effort level, Cshirk £ E, such that u{x,eshirk) > u{x,e) for all e 6
E \ {eshirk} o,nd x £ ]RI^|?^ . There also exists a state sio^ £ S such that ysi^^ =
and qsi„„ {eshirk) = ^ — 0- Moreover, U {Q,eshirk) < maxegjr i7 (y, e), i.e., the allocation
(x = 0,e = Cshirk) 'is isss desirable than the allocation that offers no insurance (and lets
the worker choose the effort level).
2. There exists a monitoring subset Gm o-i^d two goods gi,g2 S Gm such that a h yg^gi is
strictly increasing in e E E C R for any x £ Ri,_Jjf' '.
There exists 6 £ (0,1) such that, for each 9 < 9, Assumptions AI-A4 hold, £ {9) has at
least one competitive equilibrium, and any equilibrium of the economy 8 [9) is not constrained
optimal.
Alternative notions of efficiency. We next consider a weaker notion of optimality than
studied in the main text. This notion of optimahty constrains the social planner with the same
monitoring technology as the firms.
Definition 9. A price and contract allocation pair, {p,[c{u) = [w{v) ,x{i') ,e[v)\^^j^^, is
market feasible if the contracts are incentive compatible given the price vector, i.e., c{v) £
C {p) for each u £ N , and the resource constraints in (13) hold. The pair is weakly con-
strained optimal if it is market feasible and there does not exist another market feasible pair,
(p, [c{v) = {w {v) ,x{v),e {v)]^,^j^), such that U {x {u) ,e{y)) > U {x [u) , e(j/)) for all u G J\f
with strict inequality for a positive measure of f E J\f.
\^'e next provide an example with nonseparable state utility function in which the equilib-
rium is not constrained optimal, as implied by Theorem 2, but which is weakly constrained
optimal. The example shows that the inefficiency of equihbrium estabhshed in Theorems 2
and 8 in part stems from the strong notion of optimality which gives the social planner a
technological advantage in monitoring.
Exciniple 3 (Nonseparable Preferences, Weak Optimality). Consider the same setup as in
Example 1 but assume, additionally, that workers are heterogeneous in their preferences. In
particular, there are two types of workers, denoted by Tj and T2, of equal measure, 1/2. The
state utility functions of type Ti and T2 workers are respectively given by:
u{xs,e ,Ti) = In
I
a;^ + f -
-I- (1 - e)
J
x^
J
and (A.l)
u{xs,e;T2) = In ((- + {I ~ eU xl + x^
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Let (p^ = l^p^ = 1, (c [Ti] = w [Ti\ , X [Tj] , e [T'j])^grj 2} J denote an equilibrium price and
contract allocation pair in which workers of the same type accept the same contract. The
equilibrium allocation for type Tj workers is characterized exactly as in Example 1 [cf. Eq.
(17)], while the equilibrium allocation for type T2 workers is the mirror image allocation in
which the consumption of goods 1 and 2 are reversed. We claim that this equilibrium is weakly
constrained optimal.
First consider the Pareto improving allocation in Example 1 (the allocation chosen by a
social planner that can fully monitor consumption), given by e [Ti] = 1 for each i e {1, 2}, and
the consumption allocations:
For type Tj : xi [Ti] = xj [Ti] = ^ and xl [Ti] = xf [Ti] = 0, (A.2)
For type T2 : x\ [T2] = x] [T2] = and ±1 [T2] = ff [T2] = ^
.
(A.3)
We claim that the corresponding contract allocation, {c [Ti] = {w [Ti] = x [T] p, x [T] , e [7^])}^^^ 2},
is not market feasible for any relative price level p^ (recall that p^ is normalized to 1). Given
the state utility function in (A.l) (and e[Ti] = 1), the allocation in (A.2) is incentive
compatible for the type Tj workers only if p'^ < j. However, similarly, the allocation in {A.3)
is incentive compatible for the type T2 workers only if p" > 2. Hence, there is no relative price
level that can make the contract allocation {c [Ti] , c [T2]} market feasible, verifying the claim.
It remains to show that there is no other market feasible price and contract al-
location pair which is a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium. Suppose, to
reach a contradiction, that there is such a price and allocation pair, denoted by
[p^ = l,p'^,{'w[Ti] = x[Ti]p,x[Ti] ,e[Ti])^^,^r,\)- It can be seen that e [T,] = 1 for each
i G {1,2}.^^ In view of the conversion technology, the resource constraints can be reduced
to a single constraint:
,
EIE\E -f[^]<^-" ,; (A.4)
i6{l,2} s&{l,h} ge{l,2}
First consider the case p^ £ (51 2), so that type Ti workers always choose to consume good 1
and type T2 workers always choose to consume good 2, i.e., xf [Ti] = for i ^ g. Then, the
incentive compatibility constraints can be written as:
hn{ii[T,]) + l-ln{xj[T,]) > In^^^'f^^^
2 V "^ ^J/ ' 2 V ' ^ ^'^ - \2 p2
lln{xl[T2]) + hn{xf[T2]) > lnf^x?[T2]p2
More specifically, for the case in which only one type works, it can be seen that it is not possible to attain
a Pareto improvement without violating the resource constraints.
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These constraints can be simplified to
s^UTil^Q 1
„„, 4M-.9 2
Note also that this allocation is a Pareto improvement over the equihbrium allocation (cf. Eqs.
(18)
-(17)) if only if:
.
.
.
-,
i In {xl [T,]) +
^
In [x] [T,]) > In (^^tt^^ for each i e {1,2}
,
(A.6)
with strict inequality for some i E {1,2}. It can be seen that conditions {A. 5) and {A.6)
establish a lower bound on the amount of resources that need to be spent on each type workers,
that is:
xUT,]+xJlT,] > (^±+^-^^ Inn and
-2 ,rr.. ,
-2,rn ^ f ^P2 2 \ 6
with strict inequality for some i £ {1, 2}. Combining the last two inequahties with the resource
constraint (A. 4) (along with the fact that if [Ti] — iov i =/= g), we have:
3 2p2 3p2 2 13
2^ +l + -r + 3^<y ^ . (^-^^
On the other hand, using the arithmetic-mean geometric-mean inequality, we have:
3 3p2
2p2 2
?^ + J_
3 3p2
> 2,
> 2.
h 3p2
= 3 and
2P2 2
4^2p2 2
3 3p2 3'
Combining these inequalities with Eq. (A. 7) yields a contradiction. A similar contradiction
can be obtained for the case in which p2 ^ [5^2], proving that the equilibrium is weakly
constrained optimal.
The key intuition behind this result is captured by the incentive compatibihty constraints,
(A. 5). Note that a high level of the relative price p2 relaxes the incentive compatibility con-
straints for the type Ti workers (who have a greater temxptation to shirk when they consume
good 2), but it also simultaneously tightens the incentive compatibility constraints for the
type T2 workers (who have a greater temptation to shirk when they consume good 1). Hence,
the Pareto improving allocation constructed in Example 1 cannot be decentralized with any
price vector, and the equilibrium is weakly constrained optimal despite the fact that it is not
constrained optimal.
31
A. 2 Proofs
This appendix presents proofs of the results in the main text.
A. 2.1 Proofs for Section 2
We first show that Assumptions A2 and A3 imply the following lemma, which we use in the
subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2. (Local Transferability) Suppose Assumptions A1-A3 hold and consider an in-
centive compatible contract, c = {w,x,e) £ C\p). Then, for each e > 0, there exists contracts
c+,c^ S C\p) such that
V{c^,p)>V{c)-€, tt{c-,p)>tt{c,p), (A.8)
and
V{c+,p)>V{c,p), 7T{c+,p)>TT{c,p)-e.
;
(A.9)
Proof of Lemma 2. We first define a transfer function that will be useful in this and some of
the subsequent proofs. For each non-zero consumption vector xf^
,
price vector p, and transfer
level ts 6 K, we define w^ (x^^,p, t^) G R as the optimum value and x^' (a;^\p, is) as the
solution of the following strictly convex optimization problem:
wl{x<^\p,ts)= min xf>^>
,
(A.IO)
subject to u'^'(xf') = u'^i (xf') + i^.
That is, w] (xf^,p,ts) describes the minimum wage level necessary to increase the state s
utiUty obtained from the goods in Gi by ts, given that the current consumption is xf^ and
the current price vector is p. Note that, since xj^ is non-zero, there exists a sufficiently small
interval (-^,5) such that w] (^xf\p,ts) is well defined for each tg € [-6,6). Note also that,
over this interval, w] (^xf\p,ts) is continuous and strictly increasing in tg. Given the transfer
vector t = {ts)seS' ^^ ^1^° define W''^ [x'^\p,t) = (w] (xf^,p,ts))g and x"^' [x^'^,p,t) =
(xgi (xgi,^, ts)) o as the corresponding transfer functions over all states.
We next prove Lemma 2. Consider an incentive compatible contract c = {w,x,e) G C (p)
and a positive scalar e > 0. We first construct a contract c+ that satisfies Eq. {A.9). Note
that we have w] (xf^',p, O) = w] since c G C\p). Then, from the continuity of w^ (), there
exists (5 > such that
Wj (if',p, (5) e (u;],i(;s -he) for each s.
_
(A. 11)
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By definition of w^ () (and incentive compatibility of c) we also have
vP' (icfi {x^\p,5)) = vP' (xf1) + (5, for each s e S. (A.12)
Define the transfer vector t {S) = {ts = S for each s). Since c is incentive compatible and u ()
satisfies condition (8), Eq. (^-12) imphes that e remains incentive compatible after the utility
f (w^ (x^i p t{5)) u;^\(i}) \
transfer t{S). It follows that c+ = i
,_q^ \ q^^ ' , ,r/\' g\Gi\ ' ) ^^ incentive compatible.
By Eq. (^.11), this contract costs the firm at most e more than the contract c. Thus, c_|_
satisfies Eq. (A. 9). Next recall that Assumptions A2 and A3 ensure u'l > for each s. Hence,
a similar argument establishes the existence of a contract c_ that satisfies Eq. {A.8). This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider the only if part of the proposition. Let
(p, [w {i') ,x{h'),e (i^)]i,g_/v) denote an equilibrium price and contract allocation pair. The sec-
ond claim holds holds by definition of equilibrium. To prove the first claim, first note that firms
can always guarantee themselves profits (by offering contracts that will not be accepted).
This implies 7i"(c(i^),p) > 0, that is, the contract c{i') is in the constraint set of problem
(10) for all u (except potentially a measure zero set). We claim that c{v) solves problem
(10) for all but a measure zero set of workers. Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that there
exists a positive measure set A/"* C Af and contracts {c{i'))^^j^, such that c{i') and c{u) are
both in the constraint set of problem (10), but V{c(i/),p) > V{c{v),p). Since J\f* C Af
is of positive measure and the set of firms is finite, there exists a firm j such that the set
A/^ = {i^ E Af*
I
J [i^) = j} is of positive measure. Consider a contract c(;y), with i^ £ TV-'.
Applying Lemma 2 to this contract for e = V {c{i') ,p) — V {c,p) > 0, there exists another
incentive compatible contract c_ {v) such that
V{c-iv),p)>V{ciu),p) andTTic_{u),p)>TT[ciiy),p)>0. (A. 13)
Then, we claim that another firm j' ^ j can strictly increase its profits by changing its
contract offers to the workers in Af-' to (c_ (:^))j^g^j. Note that, after this change, all the
workers v
€ Af-' switch to firm j'. Since each contract c_ {i^) makes the firm positive profits
(cf. (A. 13)), the expected profits of firm j' strictly increase after this deviation, proving our
claim. This contradicts the fact that firm j' maximizes profits in equilibrium, completing the
proof for the only if part of the proposition.
We next prove the claim in the proposition that the constraint T:{{w,x,e) ,p) > binds
for any solution {w,x,e) to problem (10). Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that the contract
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c = {w,x,e) is a solution to problem (10) and satisfies 7r(c,p) > 0. Then, by Lemma 2, there
exists another incentive compatible contract c+ such that n (c_|_^p) > and V {c+,p) > V {c,p).
This contradicts the fact that c is a solution to problem (10), showing that the profit constraint
binds.
Next consider the if part of the proposition. Let p and [w {v) ,x (v) ,e{iy)]^^j^ be a
price and allocation system that satisfies the two claims of the proposition. We conjec-
ture a symmetric equilibrium in which every firm offers every worker the same contract,
i.e., {c{u,j) = [w{u) ,x{i') ,e{L')])^i^j^ -^j. Given these offers, any worker strategy is opti-
mal. Moreover, the goods market clearing condition is satisfied by assumption. Hence, we are
only left with by proving that firms' contract offers are optimal. Suppose, to reach a contradic-
tion, that there exists a firm j' that can make strictly positive profits by offering a collection of
incentive compatible contracts [c{y,j')]^^j^- Then, there exists Af* C M with positive measure
such that for each v
€ A^*
,
-
,,,,,. J (u) = j' after the deviation by firm j' , and
tt{c{i',j'),p) >n{c{iy),p) = 0. (A.14)
Since the worker y e Af* prefers the contract offered by f over the contract c(i^), we have
•
,.:
.
. V{c{u,j'),p) >l/(c(i^),p).
„ ,
,-- (A.15)
By Lemma 2 and equations {A.14) and (A.15), there exists an incentive compatible contract
c+ {i^,j') such that
tt{c+{u,j'),p)>0, &ndV{c+{u,j'),p)>V{c{iy),p).
It follows that c(iv) is not a solution to problem (10) for v 6 Af*, which is a contradiction.
This shows that the price vector and contract allocations constructed above constitute an
equilibrium, completing the proof for the if part of the proposition.
We next show that Assumptions A3 and A4 imply the following lemma, which we need to
establish the existence of equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Continuity of Incentive Compatible Contracts) Suppose Assumptions Al-
A4 hold Then, the correspondence C\p) is lower hemicontinuous in p. That is, for any
incentive compatible contract c g C\p) and any sequence p [n] —> p, there exists a sequence of
contracts c[n\ £ C\p\n]) such that c\n] —> c.
Since C^ (p) is also upper hemicontinuous. Lemma 3 establishes the continuity of C^ [p) in
p.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the price vector p, an incentive compatible contract c =
{w,x,e), and a sequence {p[n]}^i —» p. We claim that, for any e > 0, there exists an index
n and a contract c [n] = (x [n]
,
e, w [n]) such that
c{n\eC\p{n]) and w[n]€B{w, e).
'
' (A.16)
Given this claim, a sequence {c[n]}^Q can be constructed such that c[n] G C^{p[n]) and
c[n] —» c. It thus follows that C\p) is lower hemicontinuous.
To prove the claim in (A. 16), first note that Assumption A4 implies that there exists a
transfer vector t s M''^' such that Eq. (12) holds for the effort level e and the vector t. Given
this vector i, note that Eq. (12) also holds for the transfer vector -qt, where ry > is an
arbitrary positive scalar.
Next consider the function w^ () defined in (A. 10). Since w^ () is continuous in p and f,
and since w^ (i'-'^,0,p) = u.'^ > (by Assumptions A2 and A3), there exists J > such that
w^ (a;^',p, Pj e B (tf^e) nIR++ for each p and i that satisfies ||i|| < 5 and ||p — p|| < S. Let 77
be sufficiently small so that \\T]t\\ < S and define
,,
,
, .
s = y2''ltsqs{e)- max y'?]f,gs(e), (A.17)
which is strictly positive in view of Eq. (12). Since the indirect utility function V {c,p) and
the function U (x {w,p, e)
,
e) are continuous in p, there exists a sufficiently large n such that
\\p[n] — p\\ < 5 and
V{c,p[n]) < y(c,p) + e/2, and
U{x{w,p[n],e) ,e) > U {x{w,p,e) ,e) ~ e/2.
Since V {c,p) = U {x {w,p, e) , e), these two inequahties jointly imply
U {x{w,p[n],e) ,e) < t/(x(u;,p[n]
,
e) , e) + £ for all e e £; \ {e} . (A.18)
Given the constructed rjt and p [n] , we define the contract c [n] =
X [n] = (x<^i (i<^i
, p [n] , 7]t) , x'^\^' ) \
e and we claim that c[n] satisfies (^.16). By
w [n] = {w^ {x^' ,p[n\, qt)
,
w^^^^}) /
construction of x[n] and w[n\ (and 5), we have that w\n\ £ B{w^,e). Moreover, x\n\ is
incentive compatible given the wages w [n] and the effort level e. Hence, we only need to show
that the effort level e is incentive compatible. Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that there
exists e ^ e such that
t/(x(u)[n],jD[n],e),e) > ;7(x(iu[n],p[n],e),e). ' (A.19)
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Note that the construction of w [n] differs from w only for the wages for the monitoring subset
Gi- Note also that, from condition (8), the consumption choice for goods within Gi does
not affect the consumption choice for the goods within other monitoring subsets. This implies
^G\Gi
^^ j^j ^p j^j ^ g^ _
-j^GXGi (^yj^p Jtj] ^ e) for any effort level e. These observations, along with
the definition of the function w^ () (cf. Eq. (A. 10)), further imply that:
U {yi{w[n],p[n],e),e) = '^r]tsqs{e) + t/ (x(u;,p[n] ,e) , e)
.
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Considering this equality for e G {e, e}, and plugging in the inequality (A. 19) implies:
^rjtsqsie) + U {y.{w,p[n] ,e) ,e) > ^T]tsgs{e) + t^ (x (u;,p[n] ,e) , e)
.
seS ses
Combining this inequality with the inequality in {A. 18), we have
Y^ T]tsqs (e) > Y^ rjtsqs (e) - e.
seS ses
This inequality yields a contradiction to the definition of e in (A. 17), proving that the effort
level e is incentive compatible. This shows that c [n] satisfies the claim in (A. 16) and completes
the proof of the lemma.
. , ,,,. , .
Proof of Theorem 1. The key step in establishing the existence of the equilibrium is
to show that the solution correspondence for the problem (10), denoted by S [p), is upper
hemicontinuous in p. We establish this using the continuity of C\p) (cf. Lemma 3) along with
the local transferabihty condition (cf. Lemma 2).
Let {{wn, ^n, £n) )Pn}^i denote a sequence such that {w„, x„, e„) £ S (pn) for each n and
lim {wn,Xn,en) = {w,x,e) and lim p„ = p.
Note that {w,x,e) satisfies the constraints of problem (10) for the price vector p. We claim
that {w, x,e)
€ S (p). Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that there exists {w, x, e) that satisfies
the constraints of problem (10) and that yields the worker V {{w,x,e) ,p) > V {{w,x,e) ,p).
By Lemma 2, there exists another incentive compatible contract (uJ, x, e) which satisfies the
non-zero profit constraint strictly,
, ,
7r((u;,x,e),p) > 0, (A. 20)
and which yields a strictly greater utihty for the worker, ' );;.-
V{{w,x,e),p)>V{{w,x,e),p). " (A.21)
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Since {w,x,e) £ C\p), by Lemma 3, there exists (tZ;n,5„,e„) —» {w,x,e) such that
(wJ„,x„,e„) 6 C^ (pn) for each n. Since 7r(-) and ^ (•) are continuous functions, Eqs. (A. 20)
and (-4.21) imply that there exists a sufficiently large n such that
TT{{Wn,Xn,en) ,Pn) >0 and V{{Wn,Xn, en), Pn) >V {{Wn,Xn,en) ,Pn)-
But since {Tu„,Xri,en) € C^ {pn), these inequalities contradict the fact that (Tj;„,x„,en) is a
solution to problem (10) given the price vector pn- It follows that [w,x,e) 6 S {p), which
imphes that 5 {p) is upper hemicontinuous.
The rest of the proof follows standard arguments. Consider the excess demand correspon-
dence D : {1} X r!^ ' :z5 RI*^I (recall that the price of good 1 is normalized to 1), given
by:
n(r,] = { /AAEse5(^.(^)-2/.)9.(e(^))di^6Kl^l 1
^^'
[
\
iwiv),x{u),eiiy))eS{p) ioie&chiyeM j' ^ '
Since there is a continuum of workers, the demand correspondence D [p) is convex valued.
Since S (p) is upper hemicontinuous, the correspondence D [p) is also upper hemicontinuous.
We have, limps_^o D^ (p) > 0, since the supply of good g ^ \ \s bounded from above (since
ys < Qo for each s) while the demand for good g tends to infinity as p^ —> 0. Similarly,
limp9_oo -D^ (p) < since the supply of good g is bounded away from zero, while the demand
for good g tends to zero as p^ —» oo. Therefore, Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem applies to this
economy, which implies that there exists a price vector p such that G D (p). By definition of
D (p), there exists {w (v) ,x{i'),e {u))^i-j^such that {w (i/) ,x (i/) ,e{u)) e S {p) for each u & J\f
and the goods markets clear. By Proposition 1, the price vector p and the contract allocations
{w {u) ,x[v) ,e {v))^j^j^ correspond to an equilibrium, completing the proof of the theorem.
A. 2. 2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a worker v e N* and denote her allocation by c = [w, x, e).
Since {x,e) does not feature full insurance, there exists si,S2 G S and g G G such that the
MRS for good g between states si and S2 is not equal to 1. We will reallocate the consumption
of good g across states so that the worker receives better insurance while her equilibrium effort
\s\
choice e remains eff'ort-incentive compatible. Formally, we claim that there exists x^ G W_^
such that
9.(c)i| = ^9= («)!?, (A.23)
ses s€S
e G aigmaxU (x^''^^\x^,e], (A. 24)
eeE \ J
and t/(^^\{^^i^e) > t/(x,e). (A.25)
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Once we prove this claim, it follows that there is an effort-incentive compatible and Pareto
improving deviation for each worker u G Af*, which implies that the equilibrium allocation is
not constrained optimal.
To prove the claim, we first show that there exists a deviation xf that satisfies (A. 23) and
dill Xo c 1 /9x
(j4.25). Recall that -^—'' ( "' =/= 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
du{xsi, e) du (x52, e
OXq^ OXs2
9 > ;j' • (A-26)
For any e > 0, consider the deviation vector v [e] G R''^' defined by Vs [e] = for any s ^ {s\, S2}
and
r 1
^^
1 r 1
^^
, » «™x
Qsi (e) qs2 (e)
where the constant K = —^ °^
^
'
°^
— > ensures that \\v [e]\\ < e for any e > 0. Note that,
by construction, the vector x^ = x^ -\- v [e] satisfies the resource constraints in (A. 23). Note
also that
U (x^\^«> , x» + t; [e] , e) = J^ g^ (e) w (xf
^^^l
, xf + ^, [e] , e)
/ E56S9^(e)"(2^^'e)+ \
- „
, , aK(x, e) ^^ au(x3,,e) e^y
.
- '?^i ^^'l dxi^ qs^{e) VS2 le;—gj|-— ^^^
where the second line considers a first order Taylor expansion for the functions u {xg^
,
e)
and u{xs2,e), and the notation o{e) captures the residual which satisfies lime_o ^^ = 0.
From Eqs. (A. 28) and the inequahty in (A. 26), it follows that there exists £ > such that
U (x'^^'S', x^ + v[e] ,e) > U (x, e) for each e e (0, e). This proves our claim that there exists a
deviation x^ that satisfies (A. 23) and (A. 25).
We next consider a sequence of vectors {v [e [n]]}^-i, where {e [n]}^ is a sequence of scalars
such that £ [n] G (0,£) for each n and e[n] —> 0. We claim that there exists n such that
f5 =: x^ + v [e [n]] also satisfies the effort-incentive compatibihty constraint in (A. 24). Suppose,
to reach a contradiction, that there is no such n. Then, for each vector i'[e[n]], there exists
e [n] e E\{e} such that
U (x^\^3\xs + v[e[n]],e[n]) >U{x,e). . (A.29)
Since the space £'\ {e} is finite (and thus compact), the sequence {e [n]}^-[ has a convergent
subsequence. Let e E E\ {e} be a limit point of this sequence. Since hm„_^oo v [e [n]] = 0, Eq.
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(A.29) implies .V
: U{x,e) >U{x,e). . . (A.30)
Note that, since preferences are nonseparable at (x,e), there exists s,m and gi,g2 6 Gm such
that
du{xs,e) /dxV- du{xs,e) /dxf
_
pSi
du{xs,e)/dxf ^ du{xs,e)/dxf ~ ^'
where the last equality follows since c £ C {p). The last equation further imphes that
xl^'-^'^ (u;,,p,e) 7^ xi^''^^^ This further implies
U {x{w,p,e) ,e) > U {x,e) > U {x,e)
,
where the last inequality uses (A.30). This yields a contradiction to of the fact that the
contract {w, x, e) is incentive compatible. It follows that there exists a vector v [e [n]] such that
x^ = x^ +v[s [n]] satisfies equations (A. 23) — (A. 25), which completes the proof of the theorem.
A. 2. 3 Proofs for Section 4
The proof of Theorem 3 requires a preliminary step. It is intuitively clear that, if preferences
satisfy the separability condition (19), then the indifference ciurves between any two goods in
the same monitoring partition m should be independent of the effort choice e. The next lemma
formalizes this observation.
Lemma 4. Suppose the separability condition (19) in Definition 4 holds for the monitoring
subset Gm- Consider a vector {xg, e) £ IRi|_ x E, and let xf"^ denote a reallocation of the goods
in Gm such that the level of the utility is kept constant, i.e., suppose:
u(if-,xf\^"',e) =u(a;„e).
Then, this reallocation keeps the level of utility constant also for any other effort level, i.e.:
cf"" , xf\'^'" , e) =u{xs, e) for any e e E. (A.31)
Proof of Lemma 4. We first claim that, under the separability condition (19), the partial
derivative of the utiUty admits the following representation:
^}^^i^ = h{is,e)F{xs), (A.32)
where F : e'^' -^ R''^'"! is a vector valued function and h : Rl^^l x E ^ R++ is a strictly
positive scalar valued function. To prove this claim, fix some good g € Gm and define the
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scalar valued function
du (xo, e)
h{xs,e)
which is strictly positive. Applying condition (19) for all pairs [g 6 Gm,g), we have that the
ratio,
du{xs,e) /dxf'^ du{xs,e) /dif""
du{xs,e) /dxi h{xs,e)
is independent of e. Hence, it can be denoted by a vector valued function F{xs)- This
completes the proof of the claim in (A. 32).
Next, to prove the lemma, note that there exists a continuously differentiable function
xf"* : [0, 1] -^ 1+"" which satisfies xf" (0) = xf"", xf"' (1) = if'", and
u ("xf" (i) , xf
^^'^
,e] =u {x„ e) for each t e [0, 1]
.
(A.33)
Note that xf"* (i) represents a curve that lies inside the indifference surface (which is the higher
dimensional analogue of an indifference curve). Totally differentiating Eq. (j4.33) with respect
to t, we have
^
9^i(xf-(i),xf\^",e)'dxG'"(t)L
.
L ^f^_W = for each t e [0, 1]
.
dx?"^ dt ' '
,
Plugging in the representation in (A. 32), the previous equality implies:
h (xf- (i) , xf\^-, e) F (xf- (i) , xf\^'-y ^^E£_lW ^ Q f^^ g^^j^ J g [Q^ ^] _ ^^34^
Since /i(-) is a strictly positive scalar valued function, the previous equality implies that
F (xf" (t) , xf\°"*y ^^V^ = 0- This further imphes that , .
h (xf- (t) , xf\^- , e) F (x?- it) , xf\^-)' ^^£^ = for each tG[0,l],
which is the same as Eq. (A.34), except for the fact that the effort level, e, is replaced by
an arbitrary e E E. Using the representation in (A. 32) one more time, the previous equality
imphes
du (xf- [t) , x?^*^"" , e) ^^Gm u)V i ^^s {^) ^ f^^ g^^j^ t e [0, 1]
dx?"' dt ^ ' '
Integrating this equation and using the fundamental theorem of calculus, we establish Eq.
(A. 31), completing the proof of the lemma.
We next use this lemma to provide a proof of Theorem 3.
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Proof of Theorem 3. By the equilibrium conditions, [x {v) , e {i^)]j^qj^/ is incentive feasible.
Assume, to reach a contradiction, that [x{i/) ,e (i^)]^^/^ is constrained suboptimal. Then, there
exists an incentive feasible allocation \x (v)
,
e {i^)]i,^j>j- such that
U{xiu),eiu))>U{xiu),e{v))
'
(A.35)
with strict inequality for a positive measure of i/ G A/".
Consider v e N such that the inequality (A.35) holds strictly, and drop the i/'s from the
notation for convenience. We will show that the allocation (i, e) violates the profit constraint
of the indirect problem (10), that is, we claim
Y,qs{e){ys-Xs)p<Q. ^ (A.36)
ses
And similarly, we claim that the same inequality holds weakly whenever the inequahty in (A.35)
holds weakly. Once we establish the claim in (A.36), the result follows from the standard proof
of the first welfare theorem. In particular, integrating Eq. (A.36) over &\\ u £ M yields a
contradiction to the fact that \x{v)
,
e (i^)]i,g_A.^ satisfies the resource constraints, which proves
that the equilibrium is constrained optimal.
To prove the claim in (A.36), we will construct a contract c = {w,x,e) which satisfies the
following three properties:
(PI) c is incentive compatible.
(P2) c yields the worker the same utility than the allocation (x, e).
(P3) c costs the firm less than the allocation (x, e), i.e.,
S2qs{e)xsP<^qs{e-)^sP- (A. 37)
ses seS
Once we construct a contract c with these properties, we have the following impUcations. By
(PI), the contract c satisfies all the constraints of problem (10) except for the profit constraint
(11). By (P2), the contract c yields the worker greater utihty than the equilibrium contract.
Since the equilibrium contract solves problem (10), the contract c must violate the remaining
constraint of problem (10), that is, it violates the profit constraint. By (P3), the contract c
costs the firm less than the allocation (x, e), which in turn implies that (x, e) also violates the
profit constraint. This shows the claim in Eq. (A.36), completing the proof of the theorem.
Hence, we are left with constructing a contract c = (ii),x,e) that satisfies the
properties (P1)-(P3). We will construct the wage and allocation pair, {w,x) as the
limit of a sequence {w[n] ,x[n]}^_Q, where the sequence will be constructed recur-
sively. In particular, let (ti) [0] , x [0] ) = {w = xp,x) denote the initial vector. Suppose
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{{w [0] , X [0]) , .., {w [n - 1] , X [n - I])} is constructed for n > 1, and consider the construc-
tion of {w [n] , X [n]). Let m
€ {1, .., \M\} denote the modulo \M\ value of n. For each s, define
x[n]^= Cxf'",i[n- l]f\'^'"') and w[n]^= ('w^,u) [n - llf^^""^), where w™ is the minimum
value and Scf"" is the unique solution to the following strictly convex optimization problem:
min x^^p*^" (A.38)
subject to u (x'^'^ ,x[n- 1]^\'^"' , e") = u{x[n - l]^,e)
.
(A.39)
That is, at each step, the vector, {w [n]^ ,x [n]^), is constructed by reallocating the goods
within one partition, Gm, in a way to minimize the costs while providing the worker with
the same utility as before. The partitions are subject to this operation one at a time and
in an order. Once we operate over all partitions, we start the process over (which is formally
captured above by taking the modulo \M\ value of n). We claim that the sequence {w [n] ,x[n]}
converges to a vector {'w.,x), and that the contract c= {w,x,e) satisfies (P1)-(P3).
We first show that the sequence {iD [n] , i [n]} converges. Note that the allocations and
the wage for each partition, (u) [n]^ ,x [n]^ "" j, is updated once every \M\ turns. Moreover,
problem {A.38) shows that the wage corresponding to each partition, w [n]^, weakly decreases
each time an updating occurs (and it is constant if an updating does not occur). In particular,
{w [?^]™}^o is a decreasing sequence. Moreover, it is bounded below by 0. This means that,
for each m and s, w [n]^ has a unique limit point which we denote by w^. This further implies
that w\n] -^ w. Next, note that, the solution x [n]^ "* to problem (j4.38) satisfies the first order
conditions: - • ' '
du {x [n] ^ , eo)
dxi
with equality if if"" > 0,
P^ > A H7 ^ }^Jg' ' "^ for each s, m, and g £ Gm, (A.40)
where A [n]^ is a strictly positive Lagrange multiplier for each s and m. Hence, given the wages
w [n], the solutions x [n] are uniquely characterized by the conditions in (A.40) along with the
equations
w [n]^ = X [n]f" p^"' for each s and m, ' : (A.41)
which hold since the minimum of the problem {A.38) is attained. Since the equations in
{A.40) — (A.41) are continuous in ib [n], and since w [n] -^ w, the solutions x [n] also converge
to a vector x. The limiting vector, x, is the solution to Eqs. (A.40) — (A.41) corresponding to
the limiting wages w. This establishes that the sequence we have constructed converges to a
vector, {wjx).
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We next show that the contract c = {w, x, e) satisfies (PI), that is, c is incentive compatible.
We break this argument into two steps. First, we claim that the allocation (f , e) is effort-
incentive compatible, that is,
'" Vjg^ (e) u (fs, e) > 2~]9s (e) "(^s, e) for each e € £. (A.42)
ses ses
We will then establish that the contract c satisfies the stronger incentive compatibiUty condition
(4). The proof of the claim in (A.42) rehes on Lemma 4. In particular, note that Eq. (A. 39)
imphes that the utility is preserved at each step of the above construction, that is:
u{x [n]^
,
e) = u{x[n — 1]^ , e) for each s. ,
Moreover, note that, at each step, the above operation reallocates the goods within exactly
one monitoring subset Gm- That is, the allocations x [n]^ and x[n — 1]^ are the same except
(potentially) for the allocations x [n]^ ". Hence, Lemma 4 applies and shows that
u{x\n]^ ,e) = u{x[n — 1]^ ,e) for each 5 and e G £'.
This further implies that the limiting utility is equal to the initial utility for any effort level e,
that is:
u{xs,e) = u{xs,e) for each s and e e £^. (A. 43)
Since the allocation (x, e) is effort-incentive compatible, Eq. (A.43) implies that the allocation
(x, e) is also effort-incentive compatible, proving the claim in (A. 42).
We next prove that the contract c is incentive compatible. Given wages w and some effort
choice e £ E, the worker's consumption choice satisfies the following first order conditions:
du{xs,e)
dx;^3
< 7™p^ for each s,m, gG G"", (A. 44)
with equahty if xf"> > 0,
where 7^ is a positive Lagrange multiplier for each s and m. In particular, the workers'
consumption choice is uniquely determined by the conditions in {A.44) along with the budget
constraints:
lii^ = xf""p*^" for each s and m. (A.45)
Note that the first order conditions in {A.44) are identical to the first order conditions in
(A.40), and Eq. (A. 41) is identical to Eq. (A. 45). Recall also that x is the unique solution
to Eqs. (A. 40) — (A. 41). Hence, the worker's consumption choice is independent of her effort
choice e, and is equal to x. This imphes that the effort-incentive compatibility condition (A. 42)
imphes the incentive compatibihty of the contract c, estabUshing (PI).
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We next show that c satisfies (P2) and (P3). Note that, by construction, c yields the same
utility to the worker as the allocation (x,e), establishing (P2). Recall also that {it' ["-J^j^o
is a decreasing sequence, which implies that w = xp < w [0] = xp. Hence, contract c costs the
firm less than the allocation (x, e) and Eq. (A. 37) holds, establishing (P3). This completes
the proof of Theorem 3.
A. 2.4 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 4. We first claim that the pair, (p, [fJ-uJu^Af) ^ ^^ P^'-* °^ ^^ equilibrium
if and only if conditions 1-2 of the theorem are satisfied. Since the space, C^ (p), satisfies the
transferability condition in 2, the space, V iC (p)), also satisfies the analogous transferability
condition. Given this result, the argument in the proof of Proposition 10 applies unchanged
with stochastic contracts, proving the claim.
We next show that an equilibrium exists. First, it can be seen that the constraint set of
problem (25) is compact. Since the objective function is linear (and thus continuous) in /i, a
solution to problem (25) always exists. Next, we claim that the solution set to problem (25),
denoted by S^ (p) C V [C^ (p)), is upper hemicontinuous in p (recall that V (C) is endowed
with weak* topology). By Lemma 3, C^ (p) is a continuous correspondence in p. It follows that
V (C^ (p)) : M'"^! ^ V (C) is also a continuous correspondence in p. Then, a similar argument
to Theorem 1 establishes that S (p) is upper hemicontinuous. Recall also that S^ (p) is convex
valued since problem (10) is hnear.
The rest of the proof follows standard argimients. For a given price p, define the excess
demand correspondence D : R|^ ' =5 IRl'^l by
D^p) = [ ^MkH^')M-),e{-))^sss(''s{y)'ys)qs{e{u))dlL^dv
^
\ I p^ £ 5^ (p) for each v ^ M ' ]
Note that, for any collection of allocations, \ji^, e S^ (p)] , the excess demand in (A.47) is
equivalent to .
JJ\f J(w,x,e)
^^g
.-
where jl e V {C) is the average measure defined by "
fifc'j = f p.^ (c) dv for each C eB{C).
Note that ]1 G S^ (p), since Jl^, G S^ (p) for each v and S^ (p) is convex valued. Hence, problem
(A.46) can equivalently be written as:
,
Dip) = \f 5](x3-y.)g.(e)d/i|/ie5«(p)l. (A.47)
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Since S^ (p) is upper hemicontinuous in p, D (p) is also upper hemicontinuous in p. Then, the
saxne arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 show that an equiUbrium exists, completing the
proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we will show that there is an incentive
compatible allocation, t), that satisfies the resource constraints and improves the utility of the
worker over the equilibrium allocation, t] = My|(x,e)-
Let A** = A* Hsupp (77), and note that A** is compact (since A* is compact and supp (77) is
closed) and that 77 (^**) = rj {A*) > 0. Let (x, e) e A** and note that Definition 7 imphes that
preferences are nonseparable at the deterministic allocation {x, e). Then, consider the deviation
coiistructed in the proof of Theorem 2. In particular, for each £ > 0, let v [e
\
(x, e)] 6 M'"^!
denote the vector constructed in (A. 27). Note that \\v\e
\
(x,e)]|| < £, and that v[£
\
(x,e)]
is continuous in (x, e). Recall also that, by the proof of Theorem 2, there exists s such that
-'/ '
f/ fx^\^»^ x^ + I) [e
I
(x, e)]
,
e) > ;7 (x, e) (A.48)
C((x,e),£)-^
I C\[g]
for each e < e and each (x,e) e A**. For each e e (0,5), define the function ({,£): A —* A
with:
(x,e) if (x, e) G A\A**,
{x^\^3}^x9 + v[s\ (x, e)] , e) if (x, e) e A**.
Note that C('i£) is a measurable function from {A,B{A)) to {A,B{A)), because the pertur-
bation function v[£
\
(x, e)] is continuous in (x,e). Hence, given the probability measure 77,
the function C('i-) induces another probability measure over {A, 6 {A)) (the push-forward
measure), defined by:
','-1
T][e]I^Aj =Til^C [A, £)]. ioi each A eB{A).
Note that 77 [e] is a stochastic allocation. Moreover, by equation (A.48) and by the definition
of 77 [e], we have that U^ {rj [e]) > U^ (77) and that 77 [s] satisfies the resource constraints (27).
We next consider the sequence of stochastic allocations {77 [e [7i]]}^j, where {e [n]}^_-^ is a
sequence of scalars such that e [n] e (0, e) for each n and e [n] —> 0. We claim that there exists n
such that 77 [e [n]] is also incentive compatible. Suppose, to reach a contradiction, that for each
n, supp (77 [e [n]]) is not a subset of the set of deterministic incentive compatible allocations, A .
By the construction of 77 [e [n]], this implies that there exists a vector (x [n] , e [tz]) G A** such
that the perturbed vector ( x [n] ^^^'
,
x [n]^ + v[e [n]
\
(x [n\
,
e [tt])]
,
e [n] ) is not an element
of A^ . That is, there exists e [ti] e £ \ {e [n]} such that
U (x [nf^^^'' , X [nY + v[s [n] | (x [71] , e [n])] , e [n]) >U{x\n],e [n])
.
(A.49)
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Since the space A** x E is compact, the sequence of vectors, {(2; [n] ,e [n]) ,e [n]}^j, has a
convergent subsequence. Let {x, e, e) 6 A** x E he & Hmit point of this sequence and note that
e 7^ e (since e [n] 7^ e [n] for each n). Note also that Eq. (A.49) impUes
U{x,e) > U{x,e).
Since preferences are nonseparable at the deterministic allocation {x, e) G A**, by the proof of
Theorem 2, we have
U {x{w = xp,p, e) ,e) > U {x, e) > U (x, e)
.
This yields a contradiction to the fact that the contract, c= {w = xp, x, e) is incentive compat-
ible (the contract c is incentive compatible since the allocation, {x, e) G A**, is in the support
of the equilibrium stochastic allocation, 77 — /^^|(x,e))- This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that ('7^)|^gA/' is not constrained
optimal. Then, there exists an effort-incentive compatible and feasible stochastic allocation
ilu) \u€J\f such that
i7^(r?J>t/«(77j - ,-•:.,:,:• (A.50)
with strict inequality for a positive measure of v G J\f.
Consider an allocation rji^ e M for which the inequality in (A.50) is satisfied strictly, and
drop the i^'s from the notation for convenience. We will show that the allocation 77 violates the
profit constraint of the indirect problem (25), that is, we claim
/ X]9^(^^(2/s-a;s)p cR7<0. .',, (A.51)
J(w,x,e)eC V^g5 /
And similarly, we claim that the same inequality holds weakly whenever the inequality in (A.51)
holds weakly. Once we estabhsh the claim in (A.51), the result follows from the standard proof
of the first welfare theorem. In particular, integrating Eq. (A.51) over all v G Af yields a
contradiction to the fact that {t}^)^^/^ satisfies the resource constraint (27), which proves that
the equilibrium is constrained optimal.
Consider (x, e) £ supp {fj) and note that (x, e) C A-' since fj is incentive compatible. By
the proof of Theorem 3, there exists a contract c = {w,!, e) that satisfies properties (P1)-(P3),
where recall that (PI) <=^ c G C' (p), (P2) -^^ U (x,e) = U (x,e), and
,
- (P3) 4=> ^g,(e)x,p<^g,(e)x,p. , • (A.52)
seS seS :;
Prom the construction in Theorem 3, it can also be seen that the contract c [x, e] =
{w [x, e] , X [x, e] , e) is a continuous function of (x, e), for each (x, e) £ supp (?/). Extend c [•] to a
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measurable function over all of A by defining c [x, e] = {ili = xp, x, e) for each (x, e) ^ supp {fj).
Note that c [•] is a measurable mapping from {A, B {A)) to (C, B (C)). Hence, given the proba-
bility measure t] over (^4, B {A)), the mapping c [•] induces a probability measure over (C, B (C))
(push-forward measure), defined by:
jl (C^ = fj (c-^ (^C'j'^ for each C e B (cV
Note that the support of fi is in C^ [p), since property (PI) imphes that c[x, e] e C' {p) for
each (x. e) 6 supp[f}). Hence, the stochastic contract jj. is incentive compatible. Moreover,
property (P2) and the fact that (A. 50) is satisfied strictly implies that fi yields the worker
strictly greater utility than the equilibrium allocation p.. Since the equilibrium allocation /z
solves problem (A. 50), it follows that fi violates the remaining constraint of (yl.50), that is:
/ \^(}s{e){ys-Xs)p\dlL\(^^^)<Q.
By property (P3) and the definition of /i, we also have that the stochastic allocation y\ix^e)
costs the firm more than the allocation r\. This imphes the inequality (A. 51), completing the
proof of Theorem 6.
.
.
A. 2. 5 Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Lemma 1. We first claim that U3^^^^^ {u) > U^^ {p,u) holds for all u e U and
equiUbrixmi price vector p e P{u). Note that the solution to problem (28) is always weakly
greater than the solution to problem (25) (because the equilibrium allocation [Mi/|(x,e)] pA/ is
always in the constraint set of problem (28)). Since problems (28) and (29) are equivalent, it
follows that f/^o„„er (u) > t/g^ {p, u), proving the claim.
We next prove the lemma. First consider the only if part, that is, suppose the equi-
librium allocation, Pi,\(x e) > ^^ e-constrained optimal. Suppose, to reach a contradic-
tion, that ?7p^^„„,,(u) i [uS,ip,u),U,^^{p,u) + e]. Since U^nnerM > U^q{p,u), we have
^planner i'^) -* ^eq (Pi u) + e. Let f] denote the solution to problem (29) and consider the alloca-
tion [fii,]^^j^, defined hy fj^ = fj for each v. The allocation [f]^]^,^j^ is effort-incentive compatible
and feasible, and it improves every worker's utility by more than e. This contradicts the fact
that the equilibrium allocation [/J.i,|(x,e)] ^at i^ constrained optimal, proving the only if part
of the lemma.
Next consider the if part, that is, suppose f^Q„„gr ('^) ^ [^Sj (Pi ^) i ^4 (^' "") + ^] • ^^P"
pose, to reach a contradiction, that the equilibrium is not constrained optimal. Then, there
exists an allocation, [fii^Ji^^j^, which is effort-incentive compatible and feasible, and which im-
proves the utility of all workers by e (and strictly so for a positive measure workers). Consider
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the average allocation f] defined in Eq. (30), which satisfies the resource constraints, and which
is incentive compatible since V {A ) is a convex set. Hence, fj is in the constraint set of problem
(29). Moreover, since \f]^]^ is a Pareto improvement, the average allocation i) improves the
utility of all workers by strictly more than e, that is, U^ (f)) > U^ (p, u) + z. It follows that
^pianneT (") > ^e^ (P' '^) + ^' which yields a contradiction, completing the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 7. We first claim that U3^^^^^ (u) is continuous in u E U (where recall
W is a metric space with the sup norm). To show this, first consider the set of deterministic
incentive compatible allocations, A (u):
A^ {u) = <.{x,e) e A
\ yj qs (e) u {x, e) > S^ 9« (^) ^ (^' ^) ^°^ ^^'^^ e e E > .
Note that A^ (u) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence of u. Next, since each u E U
satisfies Assumption A3 for the same function u'-'^ (•), an argument similar to the proof of
Lemma 3 shows that A^ {u) is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence of u. It follows that
A^ {u) is a continuous correspondence of u. This further implies that V {^A^ [u)) is also a
continuous correspondence of u (when viewed as a correspondence from U to V{A)). Then,
an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the solution to problem (29) is
upper hemicontinuous, and the optimal value is continuous (i.e., a version of the Maximum
Theorem applies to problem (29)). This shows that ^^anner ('") ^^ continuous in u.
Consider next the correspondence U : W =? M defined by
U^^{u) = {U^^{p,u)\pEP{u)], - (A.53)
where recall that P [u) is the equilibrium price correspondence defined in (32). We claim that
the correspondence t/g [u) is upper hemicontinuous in u. To see this, let S^ {p,u) C V {A )
denote the solution to problem (25), and recall that U^{p,u) denotes the optimal value of
the same problem. A similar argument to the previous paragraph establishes that U^ (p, u)
is a continuous function and S{p,u) is a continuous correspondence of {p,u). By the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 4,' the excess demand correspondence is given by
Dip,u) = ll Y,{xs-ys)qs{e)dfi\~^eS^{p,u)y
Since S^ (p, u) is upper hemicontinuous, D {p, u) is also upper hemicontinuous in (p, u). More-
over, note that the equilibrium price correspondence satisfies:
p (u) = |p e r!^i j e D (p, u)
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Since D {p, u) is upper hemicontinuous in (p, u), it has a closed graph, which imphes that P (u)
is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence of u. Since P (u) is upper hemicontinuous and
U^ {p, u) is continuous, Eq. (A. 53) imphes that Ug^ {u) is upper hemicontinuous, proving the
claim.
We have thus estabUshed that US^^^^j. (u) is a continuous function and U^^ (u) is a contin-
uous correspondence of u e U. Next consider the values of these expressions for u = u. Recall
that any equihbrium of the economy S (u) is constrained optimal by Theorem 6. Then, by
Lemma 1, it follows that Ug^ {u) is a singleton and it is equal to US^^^^^^ (u), that is,
Ki^)={Uplanner{u)}. (A.54)
Fix some e > 0. From the continuity of US^^^^^ (•), there exists 6pianner > such that, if
||u - nil < Jpianner, then
\UXnnerN-UXnneri^)\<£/^- ' (A.55)
D
Similarly, from the upper hemicontinuity of t/g„ (•) and Eq. {A.54), there exists 6eq such that
if ||U - u|| < SplanneT, then
Ue, - U±^^,A^) < 5/2 for any t\, e 1/J (u)
.
(A.56)
Let 5 = min [Spianner, 5eq) and note that Eqs. (A.55) and (A.56) imply U^^^^^^^ {u) - Ueq
Jeg G U gg
r>
for any u e B {u, S) and any Ueq € ^q {u). By Lemma 1, it follows that any equihbrium of
any economy 8^ (u), with u G B (u,6), is e-constrained optimal. This completes the proof of
Theorem 7.
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